The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) conducted an important crash test on March 30, 2017. They crashed a car at 35 mph into the side of a trailer equipped with AngelWing side guards. This crash test was later repeated successfully at 40 mph at the Second Underride Roundtable on August 29, 2017. It was official. Deadly side underride tragedies could be prevented.
What seemed perhaps even more significant was the fact that the following day, March 31, 2017, the IIHS conducted a second crash test into the side of a trailer — only this time, there was no side guard. The stark contrast of the two crashes was captured on film for all to see. Who could argue the benefit of this feasible feat of engineering technology?
Apparently it has not been enough to convince everyone, as we are still struggling to bring this uphill battle to an end five years later. Pray that Pete Buttigieg, the Secretary of Transportation, who is tasked by Congress with making a determination this year, will conclude that saving lives is worth the cost to require trailer manufacturers to equip new trailers with side guards. Otherwise, the inaction of industry and government will allow the senseless, violent slaughter of unprotected road users to continue day after day, year after year — while engineering solutions sit on the shelf gathering dust.
If you had to guess how many people have died from truck underride, or more specifically from side underride, since DOT talked about side guards on March 19, 1969, what would you say? Well, nobody can say for sure, but I did some Back of the Envelope Math today — using the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) undercounted underride death data.
Why would we equip some trucks to prevent rear underride but not side or front? And why not equip ALL large trucks with available underride prevention technology?
It might not be exact, but it certainly is revealing.
Fifty-three years ago, the Department of Transportation published their intention to add underride protection to the sides of large vehicles after the completion of technical studies. That was on March 19, 1969. In less than a week, 19,358 days will have passed. Surely there’s been enough time to complete research on this long-overdue rulemaking.
So I’m thinking that it isn’t unreasonable to expect NHTSA to make the Underride Initiative a high priority — especially since President Biden signed a bill on November 15, 2021, which included a requirement for the Secretary of Transportation to complete side guard research within a year and then to make a determination as to whether a side guard regulation is warranted.
It might even be a good idea for NHTSA to issue a Request for Comments (RFC) right away — to give the Public a chance to comment on the costs and benefits of adding side underride protection to large trucks. Shouldn’t Secretary Buttigieg want access to as much information as possible when he makes his decision by November 15, 2022? It is, after all, a matter of life & death.
“In both tests, a midsize car struck the center of a 53-foot-long dry van trailer. In the AngelWing test, the underride guard bent but didn’t allow the car to go underneath the trailer, so the car’s airbags and safety belt could properly restrain the test dummy in the driver seat. In the test with no underride guard for protection, the car ran into the trailer and kept going. The impact sheared off part of the roof, and the sedan became wedged beneath the trailer. In a real-world crash like this, any occupants in the car would likely sustain fatal injuries.“March 2017 IIHS Side Crash Tests at 35 mph; 8/29/17 40 mph crash test
I’m grateful that the U.S. Department of Transportation announced their National Roadway Safety Strategy (NRSS) on January 27, 2022. Like others, I’ve waited a long time to hear that news.
“We cannot tolerate the continuing crisis of roadway deaths in America. These deaths are preventable, and that’s why we’re launching the National Roadway Safety Strategy today – a bold, comprehensive plan, with significant new funding from President Biden’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg. “We will work with every level of government and industry to deliver results, because every driver, passenger, and pedestrian should be certain that they’re going to arrive at their destination safely, every time.” U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg Announces Comprehensive National Roadway Safety Strategy, January 27, 2022
While U.S. DOT has many tools at its disposal and will shoulder our responsibility, this must be a coordinated effort with our stakeholders across the public sector, private sector, advocacy, and research communities. National Roadway Safety Strategy, USDOT, January 2022
On the other hand, I heard strikingly similar rhetoric when Secretary Foxx spoke about the Toward Zero Deaths initiative in March 2015, as well as when NHTSA launched the Road to Zero Coalition in partnership with the National Safety Council on October 5, 2016 (more than a year after we launched our Vision Zero Petition). Here are some relevant quotes:
“We embrace the vision of Toward Zero Deaths; it provides an overarching and common vision that drives and focuses our efforts to achieve our shared goal to eliminate injuries and fatalities on our roadways,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx. “The U.S. Department of Transportation will do our part by aggressively using all tools at our disposal – research into new safety systems and technologies, campaigns to educate the public, investments in infrastructure and collaboration with all of our government partners to support strong laws and data-driven approaches to improve safety.” AASHTO introduces Toward Zero Deaths Plan to reduce roadway fatalities, 3/10/2015
Deja vu. And what has changed? In any case, here we are. So let’s talk about how the NRSS could be applied to a specific traffic safety issue — truck underride. One Safe System principle included in the NRSS is Redundancy:
Redundancy is Crucial. Reducing risks requires that all parts of the transportation system be strengthened, so that if one part fails, the other parts still protect people.
The Safe System Approach emphasizes that redundancy is critical, and safer roadways mean incorporating design elements that offer layers of protection to prevent crashes from occurring and mitigate harm when they do occur.
This sounds exactly like the combination of crash avoidance technologies (along with improving driver behavior) to prevent crashes from happening, plus underride protection to reduce injuries when crashes do occur. In fact, I’ve previously written about that very topic:
The reality is that crash avoidance technologies cannot prevent all crashes. Even though crash avoidance technologies may be able to reduce speed at impact, they doesn’t necessarily prevent a collision from happening in every instance. In fact, when collisions do occur between a passenger vehicle and a large truck — even at 15 mph — they will likely result in deadly underride and Passenger Compartment Intrusion unless effective underride protection has been installed on the truck.
The NRSS uses the word zero 16 times, including here:
Zero is the only acceptable number of deaths on our highways, roads, and streets. The United States Department of Transportation is committed to taking substantial, comprehensive action to significantly reduce serious and fatal injuries on the Nation’s roadways.
U.S. DOT recognizes the Safe System Approach as encompassing all the roadway safety interventions required to achieve the goal of zero fatalities, including safety programs focused on infrastructure, human behavior, responsible oversight of the vehicle and transportation industry, and emergency response.
Therefore, I will expectantly draw the conclusion that the redundancy principle and the goal of zero fatalities will spur the US DOT to carry out their responsibility to oversee the transportation industry and thereby issue comprehensive underride protection rulemaking — front, side, & rear, on both tractor-trailers and Single Unit Trucks. To do otherwise is hypocrisy.
Will it be necessary for me to continue to ask the question: Is every death unacceptable? Were my daughters’ lives considered worth saving — along with countless other victims of Death By Underride? Is #ZeroTrafficDeaths meaningless rhetoric? Or, is it possible that I can count on the Department of Transportation to prioritize the saving of lives by issuing comprehensive underride rulemaking in which cost benefit analysis is no longer weighted in favor of industry?
Likewise, can I expect when NHTSA is informed of potential safety defects that they will proceed with formal investigations — no matter how many deaths and serious injuries have been reported?
As I contemplated the work ahead of the Department of Transportation and the trucking industry to advance side underride protection, I realized that the lack of a standard for side guards could be a problem. Actually, that is why we gathered together a group of engineers in 2020 to tackle the development of a Consensus Side Guard Standard. But there is a history to the decades-long effort that led up to this which I feel is important to document here:
This is a Timeline of activities leading up to the development of a Consensus Side Guard Standard. It provides a detailed overview of the multiple individuals and organizations who have contributed to raising awareness, researching, and collaborating to create a standard which the government can require and the industry can adopt to bring an end to preventable side underride tragedies.
My hope is that this resource will be reviewed, studied, and turned to as the Underride Initiative moves forward in the coming year. Let’s not reinvent the wheel but rather — with a sense of urgency — let’s build upon the work which has gone before us.
This timeline is not an exhaustive record of all the people who have played a part in advancing underride awareness, research, and protection. There are many people not mentioned here with whom I’ve crossed paths and many who worked on this problem long before I ever became aware of it. Much of that is chronicled in the thousands of posts written on this website.
They are all part of a nationwide, in fact international, Underride Initiative. Thank you, TEAM Underride, for your hard work and dedication to this cause.
We are so thankful for the many people who have contributed over the years to developing effective underride protection. This video was created in gratitude for their hard work. It provides only a brief glimpse and leaves out many people who should rightly be included in this Underride Hero Hall of Fame. Credit goes to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety for their tour guide’s description of the IIHS underride crash testing efforts at their Ruckersville, Virginia, research & testing facility.
In 2020, I became aware of further proof that underride regulatory analysis was both flawed and non-transparent. For some reason, in 2017, the FMCSA contracted with the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to carry out a Study of Truck Side Guards to Reduce Pedestrian Fatalities. Originally the study goals were listed on the website like this:
Five key tasks are included in this project: (1) study interaction of a potential side guard with other truck parts and accessories (e.g., fuel tanks, fire extinguisher, exhaust system) and the implications for a new Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation; (2) investigate applicable international side guard standards; (3) perform a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of truck side guard deployment; (4) propose recommendations; and (5) propose means for voluntary adoption.“
When I found out that there were no plans to publish the completed study results, I made multiple inquiries at DOT and Congress. Some months later, after Departmental multimodal review, the results were whittled down to a literature review and finally published here:
When I realized that the majority of the report was missing, I submitted a FOIA Request asking for a copy of the entire report but was denied due to Exemption 5:
Exemption 5 protects the integrity of the deliberative or policy-making processes within the agency by exempting from mandatory disclosure opinion, conclusions, and recommendations included within inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters. Exemption 5 also exempts from disclosure draft documents and recommendations or other documents that reflect the personal opinion of the author rather than official agency position. Finally, Exemption 5 exempts from disclosure deliberative records that may cause public confusion where the information were not the basis for an agency’s action or final report .
Any reasonable person could look at the conclusions from the published study and compare the data to the literature referenced and realize that there were problems. Here’s a fact sheet outlining the apparent flaws in the report published by FMCSA in May 2020:
A flawed conclusion and inconsistent crash analysis cut the apparent Vulnerable Road User safety benefit of side guards by approximately half.
This is bad. This is wrong. In the first place, the error leads to a flawed cost benefit analysis for underride rulemaking. In the second place, even the undercounted underride deaths for Vulnerable Road Users (pedestrians, cyclists, motorcyclists) – to the best of my knowledge – have not been included with data on underride deaths in prior NHTSA underride regulatory analysis. Really flawed cost benefit analysis.
Logic says that a flawed cost benefit analysis will lead to a faulty conclusion. The conclusion from multiple underride rulemaking efforts in the past has been that a regulation is not cost effective. In other words, those lives which could have been saved by underride regulations were not deemed worth the cost.
And, by the way, what exactly was the rationale behind leaving out information from the original study? What was DOT concerned about revealing? Would it have actually justified a side guard regulation, which would, of course, have not been looked on very favorably by many in the trucking industry? Would the study have provided a broader look at additional advantages of side guards, including their ability to increase aerodynamic fuel savings, spray reduction, wind stability, GHG reduction, or other accompanying side guard benefits?
As far as I can tell, NHTSA’s faulty analysis has resulted in “guidance” to the industry which effectively turned a blind eye to the fact that trucks with a dangerous design indisputably allow cars and Vulnerable Road Users to go under trucks and sentence thousands of road users to Death By Underride.
To compound the problem, at least in recent years, underride rulemaking has been assigned to the Crashworthiness Standards division of NHTSA in the USDOT. In my opinion, that is not a good fit. The majority of rulemaking done by NHTSA has to do with the auto industry, whereas FMCSA is the agency charged with motor carrier safety.
Furthermore, underride protection doesn’t fit the definition of crashworthiness, namely, “the ability of a car or other vehicle to withstand a collision or crash with minimal bodily injury to its occupants.“ Underride protection is installed on trucks but does not protect truck occupants. So the trucking industry gets away with claiming they’re not responsible to take care of the problem. And it isn’t a feature of the car whose occupants need to be protected, so the automakers don’t have any responsibility. Consequently, underride protection doesn’t truly fit into the current NHTSA division of responsibilities as far as I can tell. The result: on top of industry opposition, underride rulemaking seems doomed because, organizationally, it falls between the cracks.
It appears to me that this complex issue would be better suited as a multimodal collaborative project under the coordination of the Office of the Secretary rather than buried at NHTSA without suitable input from other agencies and the yet-to-be-established Advisory Committee On Underride Protection. Maybe then the Underride Initiative would get the priority status it requires and All Road Users would finally be protected from Death By Underride.
Oh, look, DOT just published their priority Innovation Principles, including this one:
The Department should identify opportunities for interoperability among innovations and foster cross-modal integration. In addition, DOT’s posture must remain nimble, with a commitment to support technologies that further our policy goals.
Will the U.S. DOT let the flawed analysis stand? Or will the coming year see significant progress in underride rulemaking? Secretary Pete, the final determination will be in your hands. Will you decide that comprehensive underride protection is warranted?
Not only have we lost two daughters due to a weak rear underride guard, but we continue to see countless loved ones lost to other families in a similar way. Senseless deaths. Solutions are available — developed by innovative engineers but too often left on the shelf while people continue to die.
I get Google Alert notifications of truck crashes every day. Here are the rear underride fatalities which I have found in the last few months:
Anyone, who observes a rear underride guard in an obvious state of disrepair, can report it to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) via their online National Consumer Complaint Database. Make note of the name of the trucking company. If possible, memorize its DOT# and get a photo of the guard. Then follow these step-by-step instructions for reporting this truck safety hazard as soon as possible:
Here are some examples of rear underride guards in disrepair — a condition which weakens their ability to stop a car from riding under the truck in the event of a collision:
Millions of trucks on the road have rear underride guards which are already too weak to prevent deadly underride. When they are not properly maintained, their strength is reduced even further.
See the DIFFERENCE:IIHS crash tests of weak & stronger rear underride guards
As of December 9, 2021, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is requiring that trucking companies monitor the condition of the rear underride guards on the back of their trailers. Truck drivers should look over this safety equipment when they do a pre-trip inspection. If this Rear Impact Guard has not been properly maintained, the trucking company and the truck driver could receive violations with fines attached at the time of annual vehicle inspection due to a Final Rule published by the FMCSA.
If a truck fails the inspection, the violation could cost a motor carrier a maximum of $15,876 and a truck driver $3,969. This could lead to the replacement of many rear underride guards — hopefully, with guards that meet the TOUGHGuard level of strength proven possible by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and now on many new trailers.
Motorists who notice guards in questionable condition can help to make sure that this important regulation gets enforced by using this tool to report them to the U.S. Department of Transportation:
Let’s hope that trucking companies and truck drivers will take responsibility themselves to properly maintain this safety equipment and even go so far as to replace outdated equipment with the stronger retrofit kits which are available thanks to innovative engineers — at a cost less than that of fines!
FMCSA has issued a Final Rule, effective December 9, 2021, requiring Rear Impact Guards to be inspected as part of commercial motor vehicle inspections on those trucks which must have them installed. This is good because a guard weakened by cuts, tears, rust, bends, or loose connections is going to be less likely to prevent a car from going under a truck.
If a truck fails the inspection, the violation could cost a motor carrier a maximum of $15,876 and a truck driver $3,969. This could lead to the replacement of many rear underride guards — hopefully, with guards that meet the TOUGHGuard level of strength proven possible by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and now on many new trailers.
This is what I know about the availability of replacement equipment:
