Tag Archives: FMCSA

What’s New In Underride? Both Action & Inaction

Despite the COVID-19 shutdown of many activities, there is a lot happening related to truck underride. Here’s a quick summary:

  • While we hope for April showers to bring May flowers, this year I was encouraged to see that the April 17 Side Guard Task Force Meeting led to multiple May Subcommittee meetings of an informal but active Underride Protection Committee — Engineering, Awareness, Advocacy, Research and Industry Engagement meetings have all taken place. Underride Protection Committee brochure
  • We also launched the SaferTruck System Award Program to encourage fleets to voluntarily adopt these life saving features. SaferTruck System Awards
  • In May, the FMCSA published a report [A Literature Review of Lateral Protection Devices on Trucks Intended for Reducing Pedestrian and Cyclist Fatalities] on the pedestrian safety truck side guard study [Study of Truck Side Guards to Reduce Pedestrian Fatalities] completed last year by Volpe Transportation Center. The conclusion acknowledges that pedestrians and cyclists could be saved by what they term Lateral Protection Devices. But the report notably fails to discuss a cost benefit analysis — included in the Volpe report — or make any recommendations. So, why did taxpayers foot a $200,000 bill for research that might not result in tangible action to save lives?
  • Guess what! I just checked and the FMCSA clearly revised the webpage from when I visited it in January 2020. The page no longer states this information (which I fortunately recorded in an email): “Five key tasks are included in this project: (1) study interaction of a potential side guard with other truck parts and accessories (e.g., fuel tanks, fire extinguisher, exhaust system) and the implications for a new Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation; (2) investigate applicable international side guard standards; (3) perform a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of truck side guard deployment; (4) propose recommendations; and (5) propose means for voluntary adoption.
  • Instead, that page now says: “This research product contains a literature review of regulations and effectiveness studies in other countries. The effectiveness estimates from studies in other countries cannot be applied to the U.S.—in part because of different regulatory and infrastructure environments— “ What?! That’s it?! What about all of the other information included in the $200,000 study? Where’s the CBA?
  • The FULL study (not simply the literature review) needs to be made available to the Senate Commerce Committee, the House T&I Committee, and the Underride Protection Committee — including the vehicle part interactions report, the cost-benefit analysis report, the Draft final report, and the FINAL Report. Period.
  • The Dragon launch on May 30 and the docking with the international space station on May 31 proves that we still know how to solve problems. Let’s apply that to deadly underride!
This geometric mismatch will lead to preventable tragedies until we do something about it.

Supplemental Underride Rulemaking Can Create Loophole In New DOT “Rule On Rules” Just Signed By Secretary Chao

When supporters of the STOP Underrides! Act of 2019 first hear the news about DOT’s new “rule on rules,” they might moan and sigh and scramble to figure out what next. On December 5, Transportation Secretary solidified the Trump administration’s approach to rulemaking:

Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao announced she has signed a “rule on rules” that will ensure the department’s regulations aren’t too complicated, out of date or contradictory.

When it comes to investigating suspected wrongdoing and enforcing its regulations, the new rules also require the department “where feasible, foster greater private-sector cooperation in enforcement.”

“This effort enhances the Department’s regulatory process by providing greater transparency and strengthening due process in enforcement actions,” Chao said in a statement. Transportation Department cements Trump administration’s deregulatory policies with a ‘rule on rules’

On the one hand, there are hints of good things there in calling for rules that are not out of date, cooperation from the private sector, and greater transparency. But those who have been around the block in safety advocacy are right to be skeptical and devoid of hope for future traffic safety rulemaking.

Yet I remain hopeful knowing that the STOP Underrides Act fits the bill by calling for a Committee On Underride Protection (COUP), whose role is to gather a diverse group of stakeholders to collaboratively keep DOT truly transparent and progressing in underride rulemaking. Will the COUP be included in the upcoming FAST Act language? I’m doing everything that I can to make it a reality.

Now, understandably, it could cause concern that, “The new Transportation Department action formalized a Trump administration requirement that for each regulatory step a department takes, it has to undertake two deregulatory moves.” However, I’m not worried because I know that it would be procedurally acceptable for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to remove the existing 1996 rear underride rules, (two of them — FMVSS 223 & 224), which would satisfy that requirement.

Then, NHTSA could issue a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) as a revision of the December 2015 NPRM underride rulemaking, which was intended to update the 1996 rear underride guard rule. In fact, SNPRMs are a valid means of improving a NPRM — based on Public Comments and new information received subsequent to the initially issued proposed rule.

No one can argue that there has not been plenty of new information on underride which has come to the surface in the last seven years. In fact, the STOP Underrides! Act nicely packages straightforward rules, based on performance standards, to address every form of deadly underride and can easily lead to an Underride SNPRM — all with the help of the Committee On Underride Protection to mold it into the best possible underride protection.

So, in this season of expectant hope, let us eagerly continue a national conversation on the elimination of preventable underride tragedies. Let our goal be to change the face of the trucking industry by making truck crashes more survivable, thus promising a better chance that more people will be home for the holidays.

Members of Congress, Secretary Chao, trucking industry, eager engineers, and families of underride victims, let’s do this together.

(p.s. Let’s also appoint a National Traffic Safety Ombudsman so that motorists and vulnerable road users — victims of every form of traffic violence — can count on a strong voice to authoritatively advocate on their behalf.)

Underride Retrofit; or, What is an acceptable number of underride deaths?

If there are people dying from an automotive defect, would we want those cars to be fixed or left as is? If there are people dying from a dangerous truck design, would we want those trucks to be fixed or left as is — knowing that if we leave the millions of trucks on the roads as is, we are sentencing countless people to death by underride?

Is there any precedent for issuing a recall on unsafe trucks, in other words, doing a retrofit of safety equipment on an existing truck? I’m glad you asked. Yes, there is.

The first one I’ll mention is conspicuity or reflective tape. NHTSA issued a mandate for retro reflective tape to be installed on trucks and trailers to increase their visibility to nearby motorists. FMCSA issued a mandate for retrofitting of existing trucks and trailers with this safety countermeasure.

These requirements were set up by the FMCSA to help improve visibility in low light conditions and help reduce potentially fatal motor vehicle crashes into the sides or back of stopped or parked trucks and tractor trailers at night or in poor visibility.

On December 10, 1992, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration or NHTSA published a final rule requiring that trailers manufactured on or after December 1, 1993, which have an overall width of 80 inches or more and a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of more than 10,000 pounds, (with the exception of pole trailers and trailers designed exclusively for living or office use) be equipped on the sides and rear with a means for making them more visible on the road. The NHTSA ruling allows trailer manufacturers to install either red and white retro reflective tape or sheeting or reflex reflectors. This tape is commonly referred to as DOT C2 reflective tape and is thus marked for easy identification. https://ifloortape.com/requirements-for-conspicuity-dot-c2-reflective-tape-for-trucks-tractor-trailers-to-meet-federal-dot-fmcsa-nhtsa-regulations/

RETROFIT requirement for retro reflective tape on tractor trailers: Under federal requirements, trailers and semi-trailers manufactured prior to December 1, 1993 must be retrofitted with retroreflective tape or an array of reflex reflectors. The final date for compliance is June 1, 2001. . . Trailers built after the 1993 date are delivered from the factory with reflective tape and do not need to be retrofitted. Bulk Transporter, March 22, 2001, Deadline Approaches for Reflective Tape Retrofit

Another example of a retrofit involving tractor trailers, or in this case a recall, is the Strick Trailers recall of faulty rear impact guards in 2016:

Strick Trailers is recalling certain single-axle 28-foot van trailers for a rear-impact guard issue, according to a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration document. More specifically, 2005-2009 van trailers manufactured July 25, 2004, to Feb. 3, 2009, and equipped with rear-impact guards using gussets 55997 and 55998 are affected. Gussets on affected trailers can increase the chances of injury during a crash, thereby violating Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 223, “Rear Impact Guards.” Owners will be notified by Strick to have reinforcements installed to the rear-impact guards at no cost. For more information, contact Strick’s customer service at 260-692-6121. The recall was set to begin on June 17.

Side by side with the notice of the Strick recall in the Landline Magazine in May 2016 was another notice announcing that the FMCSA had issued a safety advisory for one manufacturer’s tankers due to “inadequate accident damage protection:”

Affected TYTAL tankers are unauthorized, according to the FMCSA, until repairs and testing have been completed. Effective June 1, enforcement and fines will be given to owners and drivers operating any of the above tankers that have not made necessary repairs. TYTAL has notified known customers, and repairs have begun free of charge.

It seems to me that these examples demonstrate the existence of a precedent for recalls and retrofitting rules to correct dangerous designs in Commercial Motor Vehicles which could, if uncorrected, result in death and/or injury in the event of a crash.

Clearly, a truck that does not have effective and comprehensive underride protection is a safety concern. After all, the warning label which is found on the horizontal bar of a rear underride guard specifically says so:

Failure to comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act Standards FMVSS 223/224 (US) or FMVSS 223 (Canada) could result in injury to occupants of another vehicle in the event of a rear end collision with the trailer which, if not avoided, could result in death or serious injury.

Who will pay for the cost of the retrofitting? The ATA made the assertion, in their Letter of Opposition, that if Congress mandated the STOP Underrides Act — which includes a retrofitting requirement — then the trucking industry would be put out of business and the U.S. economy would be adversely affected:

Equipping the estimated 12 million trailers with a side underride guard, identified in Mr. Young’s testimony as costing approximately $2,900 including shipping, would equate to approximately $34.8 billion spent on underride guards. That staggering figure would result in what is likely the largest unfunded mandate on a private sector industry in U.S. history. Furthermore, when combined with the expected cost of labor in installing these guards, would exceed the industry’s annual net revenue, essentially putting trucking out of business, and grinding our economy to a screeching halt.

ATA Stop Underrides Act Follow Up Opposition Letter 6.19.19

RESPONSE to ATA Stop Underrides Opposition Letter

On what basis (what facts and formula) do they make such an exaggerated claim? The fact is that mass production will bring the costs down from the current price of retrofit kits (now at very low voluntary production). Furthermore, the industry should be well aware that adjustments can be made to spread the cost over multiple parties and multiple years.

Take as an example the increased manufacturing costs of trailers due to the tarriff on aluminum and steel and the ability of the manufacturers to share those costs with their customers.

Besides which, there are numerous other reasons to expect that this mandate provides many benefits to the trucking industry and the U.S. economy, including protecting the livelihood of truck drivers. Side guards will add additional fuel savings to that provided by side skirts. Production and installation of this technology will create jobs. Liability risk will go down. IRS Section 179 allows for tax deduction for equipment.

In the end, if we do not retrofit, there will continue to be many underride deaths for years to come. We then have to face the question, What is the acceptable number of underride deaths? And, who should decide that question? Congress, the ball is in your court.


Government Accountability Office (GAO) Truck Underride Report Published After a Year-Long Investigation

After the STOP Underrides Bill was first introduced on December 12, 2017, several members of Congress –Senators Thune, Rubio, Burr, and Gillibrand — requested that the Government Accountability Office prepare a report on truck underride guards. That report was published today and can be found here.

The online report is organized into sections, including Fast Facts, Highlights, and Recommendations. The GAO Recommendations are:

  1. Recommendation: The Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should recommend to the expert panel of the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria to update the Criteria to provide a standardized definition of underride crashes and to include underride as a recommended data field.
  2. Recommendation: The Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should provide information to state and local police departments on how to identify and record underride crashes.
  3. Recommendation: The Administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration should revise Appendix G of the agency’s regulations to require that rear guards are inspected during commercial vehicle annual inspections.
  4. Recommendation: The Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should conduct additional research on side underride guards to better understand the overall effectiveness and cost associated with these guards and, if warranted, develop standards for their implementation.

Here is a 46-page pdf of the Full Report.

I’m curious what Members of Congress along with the Department of Transportation and the trucking industry were anticipating to come out of the report. What did they expect to be uncovered that we have not already been talking and writing about and demonstrating for all to see at the D.C. Underride Crash Test on March 26, 2019 — not to mention, more importantly, with the lost lives of countless underride victims?

In a nutshell, the GAO team told the National Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA) that  Improved Data Collection, Inspections, and Research were needed. In fact, we already knew that, in order to get an accurate count of underride deaths (and injuries), better collection was needed. We have been talking about the need for rear underride guards to be added to the Vehicle Inspection Checklist.  And the STOP Underrides Bill calls for research to find the outer limits of underride protection.

But what the STOP Underrides Bill does not do is say to wait until better data collection has been collected before issuing a mandate to install proven underride protection. That would be like saying: Wait for 14 more years of underride deaths until you have improved collection of how many people are dying and then start using equipment (that was already available) so you know how many people you could have kept alive!

The GAO Report recommends that NHTSA take steps to add underride to the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria (MMUCC) — a guideline to states to use for their crash report forms. However, the next version will not be issued until 2022.

If NHTSA uses this recommendation to justify holding off on underride rulemaking, then they will set us all up for a continuation of same old, same old. NHTSA might sooner or later (in 2022 when the updated MMUCC comes out) START urging states to improve their underride data collection. But then how many years of improved data will they insist that they need before they can proceed with rulemaking (which itself takes 3 or more years before it gets to the implementation phase)?
 
This is what I foresee, if NHTSA is left to their own devices (unless something else intervenes):
2022     New MMUCC
2024     States are ready for better underride data collection
2028     FARS underride data has maybe improved
2029     NHTSA issues an ANPRM to test the waters
2030     NHTSA issues a NPRM side underride rulemaking (what about the rest?)
2033     Implementation of side guard rule begins for new trucks

2043    The whole fleet will have them on (maybe).

Conservative estimate of 300 underride deaths/year x 14 years (2033) = 4,200 more needless deaths (plus catastrophic injuries) if Congress does not mandate that the Department of Transportation move forward with comprehensive underride rulemaking immediately.

What GAO recommends to NHTSA are good actions, but they fall short of an acknowledgement that people have, are, and will continue to die from truck underride unless we act decisively as a nation to mandate that the industry install equipment to prevent it.

The GAO report acknowledges that the trucking industry is waiting for a mandate before it will act. The report also illustrates how NHTSA has been less than diligent to address the underride problem. So, why would we expect that a mere recommendation to NHTSA (when they have received multiple underride safety recommendations from NTSB and multiple petitions from IIHS and others over the years) would cause them to act in a timely and effective manner to fulfill their safety mission and protect the people of this country from deadly underride?

The fourth GAO recommendation is thisThe Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should conduct additional research on side underride guards to better understand the overall effectiveness and cost associated with these guards and, if warranted, develop standards for their implementation.

What more would NHTSA need to know — than what they already know, along with what would come about through the process of issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and what they would learn through working with knowledgeable members of the Committee On Underride Protection (or COUP, as mandated in the STOP Underrides Bill), who could help them identify and understand the effectiveness and costs of underride protection?

It seems clear to me that even the under-reported 219 underride deaths, on average each year documented by NHTSA in the FARS data, do indeed warrant the development of standards for implementation of comprehensive underride protection. The side guard crash testing by IIHS and others have proven that this technology is effective at preventing underride. Therefore, I would interpret the fourth GAO recommendation as supporting the need for Congress to mandate that DOT proceed with the rulemaking outlined in the STOP Underrides! Bill. DOT has demonstrated that they have no intention of issuing rulemaking without a mandate which would force them to do so.

In my mind, the GAO Truck Underride Guards Report only confirms and strengthens my opinion that it is high time for Congress to pass the STOP Underrides Bill and get NHTSA and FMCSA started on a rulemaking process for comprehensive underride protection, which we petitioned them to do on May 5, 2014.  After years of inaction on that petition, on April 4, 2018, we submitted another petition (for supplemental comprehensive underride rulemaking) to Secretary Chao — still with no tangible action taken.

Congress, the ball is in your court.

If you want to go beyond a cursory understanding of the GAO Truck Underride Report, please read this lengthy analysis of the GAO Underride Report: Karth Cliff Notes on the GAO Truck Underride Report.

Nat’l Sheriffs’ Association Resolution Advocates to STOP Underrides & Improve Commercial Vehicle Safety

Law enforcement officers might not always be familiar with the term underride, but they all too often are familiar with the devastation of an underride crash. For that reason, the National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA) Traffic Safety Committee was eager to provide us with a Letter of Support when the STOP Underrides! Bill was introduced.

Additionally, the NSA Board of Directors included this public health and traffic safety issue in their 2018  Resolutions. Find the NSA Underride Resolution here.

Of particular note, the Resolution states:

Be It RESOLVED, that the National Sheriffs’ Association and The National Sheriffs’ Association’s Traffic Safety Committee believe that retrofitting commercial vehicles is vital to the efforts to prevent these crashes from occurring, first and foremost and also to lower roadway deaths, injuries, and property damage.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the National Sheriffs’ Association and the National Sheriffs’
Association’s Traffic Safety Committee encourages further collaborative efforts by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; the Federal Highway Administration; the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; the Governors Highway Safety Association; the National Sheriffs’ Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police to monitor and collect data that properly identifies underride deaths caused by Commercial Vehicle-involved crashes.

My heroes! Thank you, NSA!

CVSA Responds to Senators’ Request to Add Rear Underride Guards to Vehicle Inspection Checklist

Do you want to share the road with trucks which have bent, rusty, or cracked rear underride guards — making an already-weak protective device even weaker when not properly maintained?

That is the current reality on our roads. So we are encouraged by CVSA’s response to our request that they add underride guards to their commercial vehicle inspections:

“There are currently 15 items on the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) out-of-service criteria that render a commercial motor vehicle operator unqualified to drive if their trucks do not meet CVSA standards,” the [Senator Gillibrand & Senator Rubio letter to CVSA] said. “This list includes lighting devices, windshield, wipers and frame of the vehicle.”

But not underride guards!

The Stop Underrides Act (S. 2219) has been referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.

In the meantime, the two lawmakers also have asked CVSA to consider upgrading the standard for rear guards with cracks, rust or corrosion to be placed out-of-service.

“We’ve been requested to look at them to see whether or not they belong in the out-of-service criteria,” Kerri Wirachowsky, director of CVSA’s roadside inspection program, told Transport Topics. “Maybe, maybe not. But before we go that far we need to see what is out there and what the condition of them are.”

Although there are federal requirements on size, placement and condition of the rear underguards, CVSA does not have a handle on how vigorously inspectors are checking the underguards or issuing violations when they’re “beat up, bent or have lost bolts,” Wirachowsky said.  CVSA Responds to Senators Deciding to Spend a Day Inspecting Underride Guards, August 15, 2018, Transport Topics

On February 13, 2019, WUSA9 reported on the results of that August 27-31, 2018, CVSA underride inspection project. Big changes coming to big rig risks, WUSA9, February 13, 2019

. . . our investigation uncovered many of those rear guards don’t measure up, and worse, hold up in accidents.

Now we’ve discovered the inspectors responsible for red-flagging dangerous rear guards, have very little power to do much about it.

As a result [of the underride inspection project], CVSA is now making major changes. 

  • It’s retraining road-side inspectors to check rear guards.
  • Asking the federal government to tighten the rules on rear guard inspections.
  • Effective immediately: the CVSA is increasing training on how to inspect rear guards. 
  • Adding it to the agency’s critical inspection item list.
  • Prohibiting inspectors from giving CVSA approved decal to any vehicle that doesn’t meet rear guard requirements.

The decals allow trailers, who have passed inspection, to roll through these stations without getting looked at again.

Meanwhile, other proposed changes will require federal approval, including adding faulty rear guards to list of things that can result in a trailer being pulled off the road, and adding rear guards to the check list trucks must meet to pass annual inspections. {* See footnote.}

The Stop Underrides Act would go even farther than the safety improvements the CVSA is now recommending. Major changes to stop underride accidents could be coming to US highways, WUSA9, February 13, 2019

We are also thankful to CVSA for their work with FMCSA on the recently published training video on the vehicle inspection process. This process now includes inspection of the rear end protection device (although I hope that they update the video with more details of what to look for, along with photos with examples of guards which don’t pass inspection).

VIDEO: A step-by-step review of a North American Standard (NAS) Level 1 inspection – narrated from the perspective of the commercial driver

* Hint, hint, hint, FMCSA. On November 1, 2018, we submitted a petition to FMCSA Administrator Martinez, asking that you add underride protection to Out-Of-Service items in Appendix G. We are still waiting for a decision.

Letter from FMCSA in response to our petition

CVSA Responds to Senators Deciding to Spend a Day Inspecting Underride Guards

Do you want to share the road with trucks which have bent, rusty, or cracked rear underride guards?
 
We are encouraged by CVSA’s response to our request that they add underride guards to their vehicle inspections. Guards that are weak to begin with become even weaker when they are not properly maintained.

“There are currently 15 items on the CVSA out-of-service criteria that render a commercial motor vehicle operator unqualified to drive if their trucks do not meet CVSA standards,” the [senators’] letter said. “This list includes lighting devices, windshield, wipers and frame of the vehicle.”

But NOT underride guards!

We’ll keep you updated on the results of their research across the country, August 27-31.

Has FMCSA Done Due Diligence To Appropriately Address Trucking Minimum Liability Insurance Question?

After a truck crash killed our daughters, AnnaLeah (17) and Mary (13) on May 4, 2013, we discovered that there were many problems with truck safety, including inadequate trucking liability insurance. In 1980, Congress set the level of liability insurance for trucking companies at a MINIMUM of $750,000. If that were adjusted for inflation, it would be $2,225,643 in 2017. Yet, DOT has not once raised that level in 37 years — thereby jeopardizing the safety of the traveling public.

In fact, on June 5, 2017, the FMCSA withdrew the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on the Appropriateness of the Current Financial Responsibility and Security Requirements for Motor Carriers, Brokers, and Freight Forwarders, which was intended to raise that minimum. The history of that rulemaking is summarized below.

Prior to that ANPRM, the FMCSA issued a Report in April 2014 , as required (actually one year late). They are required by Congress to issue reports every four years, which means another report should have been completed by April 4, 2017 (or thereabouts). “Section 32104 of MAP-21. . . directed the Secretary [of Transportation] to determine the appropriateness of these requirements every 4 years beginning April 4, 2013.”

The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 initially established the minimum level of financial responsibility for motor carriers:

The legislative history of the MCA shows that Congress included section 30 because “the issue of financial responsibility…is inextricably bound to the entry provisions of the legislation that directly concern the ‘fitness’ of the carrier to operate in interstate commerce.”11 Further, the legislative history of the MCA indicates that the purpose of section 30 was “to create additional incentives to carriers to maintain and operate their trucks in a safe manner as well as to assure that carriers maintain an appropriate level of financial responsibility.”12

The legislative history of section 30 indicates that setting minimum levels of financial responsibility would address two concerns. First, the minimum levels would “assure that public safety is not jeopardized” in connection with the increased entry to the industry due to deregulation.13 Second, the minimum levels would ease concerns that the largely deregulated industry would put pressure on safe operators to cut costs to meet the prices of their competitors, “some of which may cut costs by operating in violation of minimum safety standards.”14

https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Financial-Responsibility-Requirements-Report-Enclosure-FINAL-April%202014.pdf

Clearly, Congress intended for the insurance industry to be the gatekeeper of the motor carrier industry to ensure the safety of the American public.

MAP-21 continued the process to ensure that appropriate increases would be put in place. A summary of the April 2014 FMCSA Report, from the Executive Summary on page 1, sheds light on the matter:

On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141). Section 32104 of MAP-21 directed the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to issue a report to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives on the appropriateness of the current minimum financial responsibility requirements for motor carriers of property and passengers, and the current bond and insurance requirements for freight forwarders and brokers.

Section 32104 also directed the Secretary to issue a report on the appropriateness of these requirements every 4 years starting April 1, 2013. The Secretary delegated the responsibility for this report to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA).

Interstate motor carriers and transportation intermediaries, as well as certain intrastate hazardous materials carriers, are required by law to maintain minimum levels of financial responsibility. 2 This report explains the history of these requirements, examines the current minimum insurance levels for the different sectors, provides background on the motor carrier industry, and summarizes the findings of a recent FMCSA-sponsored study on the adequacy of the Agency’s current required minimum levels of financial responsibility, as well as findings from other reports on minimums. The report does not examine the current bond and insurance requirements for freight forwarders and brokers since MAP-21 mandated these requirements to be $75,000 effective October 1, 2013, and the Agency will report on the appropriateness of these levels after it has had the opportunity to observe their impacts.

The legislative history of minimum insurance requirements for commercial motor vehicles (CMV) indicates that Congress recognized that crash costs would change over time and that DOT would periodically examine the levels and make adjustments as necessary. A variety of recent studies indicate that inflation has greatly increased medical claims costs and related expenses. In conclusion, FMCSA has determined that the current financial responsibility minimums are due for re-evaluation. The Agency has formed a rulemaking team to further evaluate the appropriate level of financial responsibility for the motor carrier industry and has placed this rulemaking among the Agency’s high priority rules. The FMCSA will continue to meet with the stakeholders, including impacted industries, safety advocacy groups, and private citizens, as it moves forward with developing a proposed rule.

https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Financial-Responsibility-Requirements-Report-Enclosure-FINAL-April%202014.pdf

Although the Secretary delegated the responsibility for this report to the FMCSA, Senator Richard Burr (R-NC) stated to us in person on August 12, 2013 – three months after our tragic truck crash – that the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to act administratively to increase the minimum financial responsibility levels.

In fact, FMCSA, subsequent to publishing their initial report in April 2014, issued an ANPRM on November 28, 2014, to continue study of this issue. Following that, FMCSA took these actions:

  1. The Agency formed a rulemaking team to evaluate the appropriate level of financial responsibility for the motor carrier industry and placed this rulemaking amontgthe Agency’s high priority rules.

  2. This study was discussed at the FMCSA Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee (MCSAC).

  3. FMCSA asked for Public Comments.

  4. FMCSA reportedly did not receive the substantive information — through the Public Comment process – which they have stated is necessary for them to do the required cost benefit analysis (according to their interpretation of EO 12866) in order to move the rulemaking process forward (for signature by the Secretary and approval by the OMB/OIRA).

  5. FMCSA asked for voluntary compliance from the insurance industry. However, there has been no information provided from the insurance industry to verify the claim that the insurance premiums for trucking companies would skyrocket to $20,000/year when the minimum liability levels are raised (as reported to independent owner-operators by the OOIDA, who is in fact an insurer for many OOIDA members http://www.landlinemag.com/Story.aspx?StoryId=29050 ) and that “the only winners would be trial attorneys and large motor carriers.” This allegation has never been substantiated.

  6. The next step by FMCSA, according to an email which we received on June 11, 2015, from an administrator in the FMCSA, was to try another tactic to get the information from the insurance industry:

    FMCSA does not have information to estimate the increase in insurance premiums if the Agency increased the current $750,000 limit (for property carriers transporting general freight) to $4.2 million. As part of the rulemaking process, the Agency would need to gather this type of information to determine the costs of requiring carriers to increase their coverage. We just published a rulemaking on “Confidential Business Information” to help encourage insurance companies to share some of their proprietary information with the Agency for our use in the rulemaking process, without disclosing to the general public the confidential information. Hopefully, the new rules on confidential information will help us get the data we need.        

  1. The final step was taken by the FMCSA to formally withdraw the ANPRM on June 5, 2017.

It should be noted that, if the Secretary of Transportation merely raised the minimum level to adjust for inflation, the $750,000 set in 1980, using the latest U.S. Government CPI data (http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/), would be equivalent to $2,225,643.20 in 2017. Additionally, the Value of Statistical Life set by the Department of Transportation is currently listed as $9.6 million as of August 8, 2016.

https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/2016%20Revised%20Value%20of%20a%20Statistical%20Life%20Guidance.pdf

It must therefore be asked, Has the FMCSA done due diligence to obtain the required information to do the study mandated by Congress? In fact, could they have gone a step further, as we have been told by a former DOT administrator, and issued a subpoena to the insurance industry to obtain this information? Could FMCSA even have requested Congress to hold a formal hearing – as we have requested numerous times — to obtain information from the insurance industry?

Where do we go from here? What are the options at this point for resolving this issue? Given that it has been over 30 years since the current level was set, and that the FMCSA has had adequate time to act and report on this supposedly priority rulemaking, it now seems prudent to:

  1. Call upon Elaine Chao, as the Secretary of Transportation, to do what no other Secretary since 1980 has done and act upon her authority to set a new minimum level of financial responsibility for the motor carrier industry and immediately raise it from $750,000 to $2,225,000.

  2. Following that decisive action, FMCSA should then:

  • Ask Congress to hold a public hearing to obtain the necessary information from the insurance industry;  OR

  • Subpoena the insurance industry to provide the required information.

  • Then immediately proceed with NPRM rulemaking – setting it as a top priority to determine future actions which should be taken to raise the minimum levels according to other calculations besides adjustment for inflation, both now and in the future as mandated by Congress.

If we do nothing to address this problem, then we will continue to expose the traveling public to greater risk of truck crash tragedies. Who should we hold responsible for the resulting deaths? And who will bear the economic burden of this negligence?

Jerry and Marianne Karth

June 4, 2017

Sign a Petition Asking for Immediate Action: Protect Vulnerable Travelers: Demand Immediate Increase in Trucking Liability Insurance

Demand for Due Diligence Action by FMCSA.pdf

Further Information on this issue: FMCSA will withdraw rule to raise truck min. liability ins. Who is responsible & who will pay the price?

FMCSA will withdraw rule to raise truck min. liability ins. Who is responsible & who will pay the price?

Please pray for us to have wisdom on how to respond to the upcoming action (on Monday, June 5, 2017) by the DOT/FMCSA to WITHDRAW RULEMAKING on trucking minimum liability insurance  — which has not been raised in over 30 years.

This issue is one of the three #trucksafety issues which we included in our 2014 AnnaLeah & Mary Stand Up For Truck Safety Petition. FMCSA responded with rulemaking in November 2014. The 11,000+ petition signatures were added to the Public Comments for this Proposed Rule.

The AnnaLeah & Mary Stand Up For Truck Safety Petition: http://www.thepetitionsite.com/957/501/869/stand-up-for-truck-safety/

The signatures were posted on the Federal Register hereThe is a Comment on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Proposed Rule: Financial Responsibility for Motor Carriers, Freight Forwarders and Brokers: AnnaLeah and Mary Karth – Comments

Articles on this upcoming action:

  1. FMCSA Yanks Minimum Insurance Rulemaking, Heavy Duty Trucking, Truckinginfo.com, David Cullen, June 2, 2017
  2. FMCSA officially nixes rule on increasing minimum liability insurance required for carriers, Overdrive|June 02, 2017
  3. FMCSA Drops Plans to Study Raising Insurance Minimums for Motor Carriers, Brokers  This article even mentions that our 11,366 petition signatures were included in the Public Comments considered by FMCSA .
Who bears responsibility for this decades-long delay?
  1. The trucking industry for acting to delay progress on this important issue.
  2. FMCSA for not using their authority to subpoena the insurance industry to provide the necessary information for the required cost/benefit analysis.
  3. The insurance industry for not providing the requested information.
  4. The Secretary of Transportation for not using his/her authority to sign in an increase — as was originally intended.
  5. Congress for not acting to make sure that this issue is properly addressed.
  6. The President for not signing a Vision Zero Executive Order to ensure that safety rules are not delayed or diluted by cost/benefit analysis that does not give appropriate value to the preservation of human life and health.

See the April 2014 FMCSA Report on this issue: https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Financial-Responsibility-Requirements-Report-Enclosure-FINAL-April%202014.pdf

Read more about this issue here:

Fortunately we plan on submitting a public comment to the upcoming FMCSA Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee public meeting on June 12 in D.C.

Despite our requests for Congress to hold a hearing to force the insurance industry to provide the necessary financial information, no one has been willing to do this. As Jerry says, it is a very one-sided situation: The FMCSA is apparently accepting the information that the rates will sky-rocket and trucking companies will go out of business  — although no one has been able to offer proof of this. At the same time, the FMCSA is apparently not accepting the proof that the current liability level is not adequate to cover the costs to society of these truck crashes.

Furthermore, this issue not only impacts the compensation for truck crash tragedies to the victims and the cost to society, but it also limits the ability of the market to ensure that trucking companies are held accountable for their safety practices.

 What will break through this roadblock?

FMCSA Releases Large Truck & Bus Crash Statistics for 2014

Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2014 – PDF

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