On top of Wednesday’s good news. . .we heard earlier this week that — according to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety — 5 out of the 7 trailer manufacturing companies which did not pass the IIHS narrow overlap crash test in 2013 (i.e., the rear underride guard did not hold up when a car crashed into it at the outer edge of the horizontal bar) are in some stage of “redesigning their guards to improve their crash performance.”
IIHS would “like to be able to conduct new tests demonstrating the improvements,” and are “hopeful that this approach can result in meaningful changes even before an upgraded standard from NHTSA, which could still take years to implement.”
At 1:01 p.m. today, Jerry and I received an email from David Friedman, Acting Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), as a follow up to our petition for improved underride guards.
The thoughts below are also expressed in this YouTube video:
I find myself in the unenviable position of speaking up on behalf of all travelers on the road who are vulnerable and could—when they least expect it—become the next victim of an underride crash.
Jerry and I had the opportunity, on June 25, to tour the Research & Design Center of Great Dane, a trailer manufacturer. As their guests, we were able to spend the entire morning hearing about what they are doing with regard to quality control and safety, including underride guards which they voluntarily produce to meet or even exceed Canadian standards—thus surpassing current U.S. federal standards. We were able to ask questions and share our concerns about the inadequate federal standards for underride guards (otherwise known as rear impact guards).
We are perhaps better suited to ask those questions than just about anyone. After all, we had two daughters die because the car they were in rode under the back of a semitrailer.
It was an informative day. And we heard what seemed to be genuine comments that, “Cost is not a factor,” and, “Safety is important to us,” and, “We are not competitive about safety.” But what we did not see was a tangible plan to carry out their verbal commitment to create the best possible underride protection.
Now, it is understandable, amid the multitude of demands and the tyranny of the urgent, that—without a ready solution, in fact, one which would require time and money to develop—this problem has not been given much attention. But, if those who bear responsibility for making sure that this problem gets solved (one way or another) had lost two of their beloved children—or any other loved one—I can guarantee you that they would have moved heaven and earth to find a way to prevent underride.
What makes it even more distressing is that there are many individuals and organizations, who truly seem concerned about safety, including the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), and the trailer manufacturers. Yet, from what I can see, very little communication has taken place to move this problem forward from point A (guards that fail and result in death and/or horrific injuries) to Point B (coming up with a better design that will provide the best protection possible).
Great Dane, one of the major trailer manufacturers, observed that they passed all but one of the quasi-static crash tests—the narrow overlap. Great Dane also noted that their guard appeared to perform better on the full overlap test than Manac’s (which was the only company to pass all three tests in 2013). So Great Dane does not want to make a change which will strengthen one section of their guard but weaken another section. That’s understandable.
So, tell me: Why aren’t we getting anywhere? What will it take for an improved design to be researched and developed?
IIHS has done extensive quasi-static crash tests as well as analysis of Large Truck Crash information, and they are, in fact, champing at the bit—hoping to do further testing as improvements are made. Yet, we are told, Great Dane has not yet seen the details of their previous crash test results.
Great Dane, one of the major trailer manufacturers, tells us that safety is a priority to them. They even told us that they want to know how they can petition NHTSA to improve the underride guard standards. But the unfortunate reality is that there is not yet a new design; there is no improved guard. And Great Dane represents perhaps 12% of the market. What about the rest of the trailer manufacturers; when will they have a design which will produce safer guards?
On our trip home from Savannah to Rocky Mount, North Carolina, Jerry and I rehashed the morning’s events. We spent considerable time observing the many trailers which we saw on the road, and I took numerous photos of the various designs and conditions of the underride guards.
While at Great Dane, Jerry had made a few suggestions for improving the guard design. He suggested putting foam in the hollow horizontal bar. Another idea he put forth was to install panels with airbags to the existing guard—providing an additional barrier/energy absorption solution. Whether with these ideas or something else, surely, a more effective design can be created.
So, in trying to process what we learned at the meeting, I kept thinking over and over: Could an independent work group of qualified individuals, such as an engineering school, take on the challenge of creating such a design—which could then be tested by IHHS, proposed to NHTSA to aid in defining improved rear impact guard specifications, and provided to all trailer manufacturers? Could we do some kind of crowd funding or grant proposal to obtain the necessary funds to support such an endeavor? Could we perhaps even approach the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (TTMA) and ask them to seek contributions from their members for such a project?
Is cost truly not a factor? Is safety really a priority and not a competitive matter? Is it possible to improve the communication necessary to prevent more unnecessary deaths? Can we “sit down at the table together” and work this out?
Marianne Karth, June 26, 2014
(Note: I thought it was interesting that, in the photo above, a circle appeared around the very area of underride guard weakness about which we are concerned.)
See the testimony in May 2009 by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, in which they call for tougher underride guard standards and with an attachment of the history of federal rulemaking on underride guards (pasted below): http://tinyurl.com/phlaqon
The history of Federal rulemaking on truck underride guards:
1953 Interstate Commerce Commission adopts rule requiring rear underride guards on trucks and trailers but sets no strength requirements.
1967 National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB), predecessor to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), indicates it will develop a standard for truck underride guards.
1969 NHSB indicates it will conduct research on heavy vehicle underride guard configurations to provide data for the preparation of a standard. In the same year the Federal Highway Administration publishes a proposal to require trailers and trucks to have strong rear-end structures extending to within 18 inches of the road surface.
1970 NHSB says it would be “impracticable” for manufacturers to engineer improved underride protectors into new vehicles before 1972. The agency considers an effective date of January 1, 1974 for requiring underride guards with energy-absorbing features as opposed to rigid barriers.
1971 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommends that NHTSA require energy-absorbing underride and override barriers on trucks, buses, and trailers. Later in the same year NHTSA abandons its underride rulemaking, saying it has “no control over the vehicles after they are sold” and “it can only be assumed that certain operators will remove the underride guard.” The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS), predecessor to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, considers a regulatory change that would prohibit alteration of manufacturer-installed equipment. This would nullify the major reason NHTSA cited for abandoning the proposed underride standard.
1972 NTSB urges NHTSA to renew the abandoned underride proposal.
1974 US Secretary of Transportation says deaths in cars that underride trucks would have to quadruple before underride protection would be considered cost beneficial.
1977 IIHS testifies before the Consumer Subcommittee of the US Senate Commerce Committee, noting that devices to stop underride have been technologically available for years. IIHS tests demonstrate that a crash at less than 30 mph of a subcompact car into a guard meeting current requirements results in severe underride. IIHS also demonstrates the feasibility of effective underride guards that do not add significant weight to trucks. IIHS petitions NHTSA to initiate rulemaking to establish a rear underride standard. The agency agrees to reassess the need for such a standard and later in the year announces plans to require more effective rear underride protection. BMCS publishes a new but weak proposal regarding underride protection.
1981 NHTSA issues a proposal to require upgraded underride protection.
1986 IIHS study reveals that rear guards designed to prevent cars from underriding trucks appear to be working well on British rigs.
1987 European underride standard is shown to reduce deaths caused by underride crashes.
1996 NHTSA finally issues a new standard, effective 1998.
I would like to do what I can to make a bridge between those who study truck safety issues, the trucking industry, and the regulators. It seems to me that it would help if we would all take a deep breath, not get defensive, and work really hard to understand all of the factors involved in “truck safety” and make sure that the roads are as safe as possible.
Specifically, I would like to do my part in clearing up some possible confusion about underride guards on large trucks. Two aspects: the impact of rigidity and the type of trucks which need to have them.
In the fall of 2013, I read an article online written by an investigative reporter about the inadequacy of current standards for underride guards. It included some quotes from the trucking industry and one in particular caught my attention and—because of what happened in our crash—caused me consternation. It didn’t make sense:
“— Response from trucking, trailer industries —
If the NHTSA creates new standards, it could be expensive for the trucking and trailer industries, and some argue tougher guards are not even the answer.
‘This type of accident usually involves serious driver error, so the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association notes first that the rules already in place to prevent these accidents must be followed, including regulations against speeding or driving while impaired or distracted,’ said Jeff Sims, TTMA president, in an emailed statement to WRTV. ‘Proper maintenance of vehicle lighting equipment is also critical, both for passenger vehicle headlights and trailer tail lights and reflective tape.”‘
Sims argued that more rigid guards could lead to more deaths and more significant injuries.
While that may have been true at one time, it definitely no longer is the case. Due to advances in technology, cars have become much more crash-worthy, i.e., they are better able to absorb the energy of a crash and protect the passengers.
Notice—in direct contrast to the quote above—what the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) said in their March 2011 Status Report on underride guards (written two years prior to that 2013 quote from the trucking industry):
“Meanwhile, the passenger vehicle fleet has changed dramatically since NHTSA wrote the standards. Regulators then were concerned that ‘overly rigid guards could result in passenger compartment forces that would increase the risk of occupant injuries even in the absence of underride.’ The agency also recognized the need for balancing energy absorption with guard strength because ‘the more the guard yields, the farther the colliding vehicle travels and the greater likelihood of passenger compartment intrusion.’
“Underride crashes can be catastrophic for people in passenger vehicles that run into the backs of heavy trucks. The steel guards on the backs of big rigs are supposed to stop smaller vehicles from sliding underneath trailers, but a new Institute analysis of real-world crashes indicates that too often rear guards intended to prevent underride buckle or break away from their trailers — with deadly consequences. To understand how this happens, the Institute ran a series of crash tests and discovered that guards meeting federal safety standards can fail in relatively low-speed crashes….
‘Cars’ front-end structures are designed to manage a tremendous amount of crash energy in a way that minimizes injuries for their occupants,’ says Adrian Lund, Institute president. ‘Hitting the back of a large truck is a game changer. You might be riding in a vehicle that earns top marks in frontal crash tests, but if the truck’s underride guard fails — or isn’t there at all — your chances of walking away from even a relatively low-speed crash aren’t good.‘” http://www.iihs.org/iihs/sr/statusreport/article/46/2/1
Another area of concern is that the current federal standards allow for certain types of large trucks to be exempt from these underride regulations. IIHS has indicated that this is a big mistake.
“Many of the cases of severe underride involved trucks and trailers exempt from underride-related safety standards. More than half of the trucks in the study weren’t required to have guards, although many had them anyway. The two largest exempt groups were trailers with rear wheels set very close to the back of the trailer and straight trucks (single-unit trucks with a cab and cargo body on one chassis). Dump trucks represented a particularly hazardous category of straight truck. They accounted for about one-third of the straight trucks but half of all the straight truck crashes involving severe or catastrophic underride.” http://www.iihs.org/iihs/sr/statusreport/article/46/2/1
How much of the opposition to change in safety standards is due to a misunderstanding of the factors involved? It is very distressing to me that somebody could die as a result.
“…Driving while fatigued is comparable to driving drunk, only there is not the same social stigma attached. Like alcohol, fatigue affects our ability to drive by slowing reaction time, decreasing awareness and impairing judgment. Driving while sleep impaired is a significant issue, and is no longer tolerated. Legislation {in Canada} is beginning to change by handling collisions cause by a fatigued driver as seriously as alcohol-impaired crashes.”
Maybe, here in our country, we need a different, less-fragmented approach to solving the problem of truck driver fatigue–one that would bring together Public Health (Driving While Fatigued is a public health issue), Labor (truck drivers need to be paid and scheduled differently), and Transportation (the many factors that go into monitoring our transportation system–including CDL programs, technology, insurance, & safety measures like underride guards) experts. Let’s get the States to work together on this, too, so that the solutions which are created can be more effective through consistency and enforcement.
Let’s face it: we can’t get along without the trucking industry, so let’s make it the best it can be!
“Our current consumer driven economy is driven by our ability to offer a wide choice of competing products with wide scale or ‘intensive’ distribution. Consumers take for granted the choices available whether for a ‘commodity’ such as milk or high value products such as electronics. Store direct delivery and delivery of Internet purchases would not be possible without the trucking industry….
Our freight transportation system enables consumers to enjoy the availability of goods which are not produced in their immediate locale because of climate or soil conditions, the lack of raw materials, utilities, or labor, or the cost of production. Such a system allows consumers a choice of goods which would not otherwise be available….
One of the challenges of the motor carrier industry is to maintain tightly scheduled transit times to meet customer requirements….If you don’t believe transportation is important, just ask Etoys.com or KidsRUs.com. Better still, ask Santa Claus who operates the most efficient transport we have ever seen.” http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/freight_planning/archive/weart.cfm
According to Wikipedia: “Product liability is the area of law in which manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, retailers, and others who make products available to the public are held responsible for the injuries those products cause.”
According to our lawyer, product liability regarding underride guards on the back of semi-trailers would involve one of the following:
design according to federal standards
proper installation
maintenance
Should a company also be held liable for the safety of their products if there are higher known standards than what federal law requires of them?
The other day, I found an article which quoted the TTMA’s reaction to the IIHS Report on underride guards. It said that, “NHTSA’s past studies have shown that serious injuries and deaths can occur in rear crashes due to the sudden forces of deceleration that are imposed on the occupants even without underride.” http://www.scribd.com/doc/94313076/Truck-Trailer-Manufacturers-Association-Underride-Guard-Response (from May 2012 and quoted here). They used this to question whether underride guards should be made more rigid.
Russ Rader, IIHS Senior Vice President of Communications, pointed out to me that, “The central argument that they make isn’t supported by the Institute’s analysis of real-world crashes or the results of our trailer crash tests.”
Rader then mentioned that, “Twenty years ago with a less crash-worthy passenger vehicle fleet, the concern about unintended consequences may have had merit. But modern vehicles are engineered to handle crashes into stiff objects. For example, the Chevrolet Malibu that IIHS used in its trailer crash tests is a vehicle that earns top ratings in consumer front crash tests conducted by IIHS and NHTSA. But in an underride crash, the benefits of that design don’t come into play. The energy-absorbing structures in the front-end of the Malibu aren’t able to do their job if the underride guard gives way. Our tests showed that a belted driver could walk away from a 35 mph crash into the back of a trailer with a strong underride guard. “
Jeff Sims, the president of the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (TTMA), was making an argument about underride guards:
“Sims argued that more rigid guards could lead to more deaths and more significant injuries. ‘A neck strain could become a neck fracture as a result,’ said Sims.”
When I read that, I thought, “Is that true? What is he basing that statement on?”
I understand that we all need to look at every facet of the issues we are discussing and attempting to understand and resolve. However, I think it is important that statements which are made about vital issues are accurate and do not misrepresent the available data and facts–or distract from needed changes.
In the case of underride guards, the claims of the ATA and TTMA do not provide citations backing up their statements. If what they have stated is in any way questionable, and yet is allowed to stand as the truth, it could have far-reaching impact.
To tell you the truth, every time I read the TTMA’s statement, I am reminded of what happened to us and I think, “What are they basing their statement on? Conjecture? And then I think about our crash: AnnaLeah and Mary went under the truck and did not survive. Caleb and I did not go under; we also experienced deceleration but did not die as a result.”
It has recently come to our attention that our petition to the Department of Transportation regarding underride guards will not have been the first one to address this vital issue.
On February 28, 2011, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)* sent a letter to David Strickland, the then-Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), titled “Petition for Rulemaking; 49 CFR Part 571 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Impact Guards; Rear Impact Protection.” (http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/large-trucks/reg-documents, #3 in 2011)
The IIHS letter concludes as follows, “In summary, IIHS provides analyses and test results showing that NHTSA could greatly reduce the likelihood of rear truck underride by reopening rulemaking on FMVSS 223 and 224 to:
1. Substantially increase the quasi-static force requirements, at least to levels that would guarantee all guards are as strong as the Wabash;
2. Move the P1 test location farther outboard to improve offset crash protection;
3. Require that attachment hardware remains intact throughout the tests;
4. Require guards be certified while attached to the trailers for which they are designed;
5. Investigate whether the maximum guard ground clearance can be reduced; and
6. Reduce the number of exempt truck and trailer types.
“IIHS urges NHTSA to begin such rulemaking as soon as possible to reduce the preventable injuries and deaths occurring when passenger vehicles strike the rears of large trucks at speeds the passenger vehicles are clearly designed to handle in the absence of underride.”
On April 3, 2014, the National Safety Transportation Board (NSTB) released a document which made Seven Safety Recommendations for Tractor-Trailers to NHTSA—including improvement of standards for rear underride guards. The document made mention of the 2011 petition from IIHS to NHTSA and commented that, “As of December 2013, NHTSA has not formally responded to IIHS’s petition, but the agency has sponsored additional research on rear underride.”
It is clearly past time for action to be taken on this important issue. How many more lives will be unnecessarily lost before those accountable for instigating change will act decisively and make it happen?
“The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) is an independent, nonprofit scientific and educational organization dedicated to reducing the losses — deaths, injuries and property damage — from crashes on the nation’s roads.
The Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) shares and supports this mission through scientific studies of insurance data representing the human and economic losses resulting from the ownership and operation of different types of vehicles and by publishing insurance loss results by vehicle make and model.
Both organizations are wholly supported by auto insurers and insurance associations.”
The Department of Transportation has regulations for underride guards on trailers. You know what I mean, that thing we have been talking about: the guard on the back of trailers which is supposed to keep a vehicle from sliding under the truck in the event of a crash.
But, too often, these guards don’t do what they are supposed to do. What if there was a better design/better standards than what is currently required? What should we do about it?
Study these photos for yourself. The top trailer has a different design and, in a crash test, the results were significantly different.
We are encouraged by the news that the National Safety Transportation Board, on April 3, 2014, released seven recommendations urging the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (part of DOT) to improve the safety of tractor-trailers. We hope that, together with the message that we deliver with our petition on May 5, Secretary Foxx and his administration will take this seriously and make significant changes in a timely fashion.
We do not want to see DOT/NHTSA drag their feet doing more studies when research has already been done. See http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2014/H-14-001-007.pdf , starting at page 8 re: rear underride guards and especially on page 11:
“As a result of the research that was published in 2010 and 2011, IIHS submitted a petition to NHTSA requesting that the 1998 rear underride guard standard be upgraded.55 The following changes were requested:
(1) Increase the strength of the guards by modifying testing requirements,
(2) Require that the guards be designed to protect passenger vehicle occupants in collisions that occur with only a portion of the guard (off-set collisions),
(3) Strengthen requirements for attachment hardware,
(4) Require testing each type of guard “while attached to the trailers for which they are designed,”
(5) Determine whether it is feasible to lower the maximum guard ground clearance from 22 inches, and
(6) Include additional types of trucks (i.e., single-unit trucks) and trailers in a revised rear underride guard rule.56
As of December 2013, NHTSA has not formally responded to IIHS’s petition, but the agency has sponsored additional research on rear underride.57”
See the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) 2011 and 2013 Status Reports on underride guards here:
