In order to move the United States Towards Zero Crash Deaths, I am asking President Obama to first set a National Vision Zero Goal and then to write a memorandum which would establish a National White House Task Force to actually make things happen to reduce crash deaths across the roads of our country.
Here is my idea for what a Vision Zero Task Force would look like:
Here are the most recent comments posted on the Federal Register for the rear underride rulemaking for trailers (including the Virginia Tech engineering student design team):
IIHS was reporting on a meeting that took place on March 16, 1977 — three days before I got married! That’s almost 39 years ago — long before any of my 9 children were born, let alone my two youngest daughters, AnnaLeah and Mary!
The government and industry apparently didn’t get underride rulemaking right then! And they clearly hadn’t gotten it right by May 4, 2013 — when Mary and AnnaLeah died from truck underride! But they better watch out, because I am not going to sit by and watch while thousands more die for no good reason!
See the testimony in May 2009 by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, in which they call for tougher underride guard standards and with an attachment of the history of federal rulemaking on underride guards (pasted below): http://tinyurl.com/phlaqon
“The history of Federal rulemaking on truck underride guards:
1953 Interstate Commerce Commission adopts rule requiring rear underride guards on trucks and trailers but sets no strength requirements.
1967 National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB), predecessor to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), indicates it will develop a standard for truck underride guards.
1969 NHSB indicates it will conduct research on heavy vehicle underride guard configurations to provide data for the preparation of a standard. In the same year the Federal Highway Administration publishes a proposal to require trailers and trucks to have strong rear-end structures extending to within 18 inches of the road surface.
1970 NHSB says it would be “impracticable” for manufacturers to engineer improved underride protectors into new vehicles before 1972. The agency considers an effective date of January 1, 1974 for requiring underride guards with energy-absorbing features as opposed to rigid barriers.
1971 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommends that NHTSA require energy-absorbing underride and override barriers on trucks, buses, and trailers. Later in the same year NHTSA abandons its underride rulemaking, saying it has “no control over the vehicles after they are sold” and “it can only be assumed that certain operators will remove the underride guard.” The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS), predecessor to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, considers a regulatory change that would prohibit alteration of manufacturer-installed equipment. This would nullify the major reason NHTSA cited for abandoning the proposed underride standard.
1972 NTSB urges NHTSA to renew the abandoned underride proposal.
1974 US Secretary of Transportation says deaths in cars that underride trucks would have to quadruple before underride protection would be considered cost beneficial.
1977 IIHS testifies before the Consumer Subcommittee of the US Senate Commerce Committee, noting that devices to stop underride have been technologically available for years. IIHS tests demonstrate that a crash at less than 30 mph of a subcompact car into a guard meeting current requirements results in severe underride. IIHS also demonstrates the feasibility of effective underride guards that do not add significant weight to trucks. IIHS petitions NHTSA to initiate rulemaking to establish a rear underride standard. The agency agrees to reassess the need for such a standard and later in the year announces plans to require more effective rear underride protection. BMCS publishes a new but weak proposal regarding underride protection.
1981 NHTSA issues a proposal to require upgraded underride protection.
1986 IIHS study reveals that rear guards designed to prevent cars from underriding trucks appear to be working well on British rigs.
1987 European underride standard is shown to reduce deaths caused by underride crashes.
1996 NHTSA finally issues a new standard, effective 1998.”
Mariolani, J., Schmutzler, L., Arruda, A., Occhipinti, S. et al., “Impact Project: Searching for Solution to the Underride Problem,” SAE Technical Paper 982755, 1998, doi:10.4271/982755.
“Rear underride crashes kill thousands of people yearly worldwide. Underride guards did not follow the progress achieved by the automotive safety technology. . .”
Losing someone is hard. Losing a child is very hard. Losing a child unexpectedly due to a traumatic event is excruciating. Losing a child unexpectedly due to a traumatic event, which you later find out was quite possibly preventable, is devastating. Losing two children unexpectedly due to a traumatic event, which you later find out was quite possibly preventable, is beyond description.
(Please note: I am not trying to compare losses or saying that one is greater than another. I am just trying to help you understand what I have faced in trying to cope with my own losses.)
Which is why I really appreciated a link shared by a friend last week. It was written by a mother who had lost her son and shares what she has learned about that kind of grief. If you want to get a glimpse of what my life is now like, please read it (or for whatever reason because I hope that it helps many people–both those grieving and those who come alongside them):
Paula Stephens, the author of that article, talks about these things related to such a loss:
“Remember our children.
Accept that you can’t “fix” us.
Know that there are at least two days a year we need a time out.
Realize that we struggle every day with happiness.
Accept the fact that our loss might make you uncomfortable.”
“Grief is the pendulum swing of love. The stronger and deeper the love the more grief will be created on the other side. Consider it a sacred opportunity to stand shoulder to shoulder with someone who has endured one of life’s most frightening events. Rise up with us.”
In case you hadn’t already figured it out about me, I have become obsessive with advocating for safer roads because I will do all within my power to stop these senseless tragedies. How I wish that ours had been prevented!
And I am obsessive about preserving memories of AnnaLeah and Mary. I hate that their lives are frozen in time while the rest of us go on. That wasn’t the way it was supposed to be. So, it isn’t that I am putting them on a pedestal; I just want them to still be a part of my life–one way or another.
And, if it seems like I’m not handling it very well, ask yourself how you would be doing if you were in my shoes. I hope that you never are.
By the way, my friend who shared that link with me, Lauri Drosendahl, only knew our family for six months before the crash that took Mary and AnnaLeah–from November 1, 2012 — May 4, 2013. But, because our two families spent lots of quality time together during those six months, and were our church family, they were and have been a lifeline to hold us up. Along with countless others.
Here you see Lauri’s family with AnnaLeah and Mary (Mary is filming the fun and you can hear her laughing and see AnnaLeah laughing):
“Basically controlling risk during crashes is an energy-management problem. Our knowledge and understanding of energy management today is a lot better than it was in 1998. And in 1998, it was a lot better than it was in 1988.”
Roger Lanctot points to the increase in traffic fatalities in 2015 and raises timely questions:
“Nothing focuses peoples’ attention quite as effectively as death and there’s been a lot of it on U.S. highways lately. Preliminary figures released this week by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reveal that for the first nine months of 2015 traffic fatalities increased 9.3%. . .
“NHTSA’s current policies and procedures enable too much bargaining, delay and backsliding and car companies have not been cooperative. . .
“It may be time for NHTSA to step up its data reporting requirements, thereby giving car makers an excuse for gathering more data while setting the stage for improved processes for mitigating the 100-fatalities-a-day carnage on U.S. roads. Sharing a little data seems like a small price to pay to solve a big problem.
“Increased and improved data sharing, aggregation and analysis is sweeping the car industry. It’s time for NHTSA to get in on the action – in the interest of saving lives.”
Our family will be delivering the almost 16,000 Vision Zero petition signatures to Washington, D.C., on Friday, March 4, 2016. At that time, we will meet with Department of Transportation policy officials to discuss our concerns and requests.
One month from now, when we head out to D.C. , we will be closing the petition. Before that happens, please help us to get as many signatures as possible.
The Vision Zero Petition Book will contain the almost 16,000 petition signatures & all comments. It will be delivered in print form and also available digitally.
Together we can call for
aNational Vision Zero Goal: Towards Zero Crash Deaths & Serious Injuries!
Aaron Kiefer is making plans to do a preliminary crash test of his innovative side/rear underride protection system – before taking it to the Underride Roundtable at the IIHS on May 5, 2016.
He has asked us to be on the lookout for two things which he needs for the crash test:
a used 53′ box trailer with its rear underride guard and its landing gear intact (not bent or rusted) and
an older model Chevy Malibu–from the year 2000 or younger.
If you have either one of those which you could donate (or sell for almost nothing) to make this important crash happen, please email me atmarianne@annaleahmary.com.
Here is more information about Aaron’s hard work to make trucks safer to be around:
Aaron plans on using the crash test results to refine his design and make it as effective as possible. Please spread the word about this need. Thank you.
I am hard put to think of a better way to show the opposite, of what we are asking Obama and Foxx to do with our Vision Zero petitions, than what is being suggested here:
According to this article, Cass Sunstein apparently is encouraging the increase of cost/benefit analysis at the price of costly delays in needed safety regulations. Cost in terms of lost human lives.
We, on the other hand, are calling for suspension of overdependence on the cost/benefit analysis process–if it leads to delays and blockage of safety regulations which have been proven to save lives.
After I discussed this concern with another safety advocate, he suggested the alternative approach of cost-effectiveness analysis vs cost/benefit analysis. I have taken a quick look at a description of it online and will be thinking about it further.
“Cost–effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a form of economic analysis that compares the relative costs and outcomes (effects) of two or more courses of action. Cost–effectiveness analysis is distinct from cost–benefit analysis, which assigns a monetary value to the measure of effect.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost-effectiveness_analysis
My question is, “Would such an approach lead to a reduction in crash deaths & serious injuries?” In other words, would it further the goal of Vision Zero? Towards Zero.