Perry Ponder from Seven Hills Engineering makes some timely observations. Anyone concerned about preventing deadly underride crashes will want to make sure that regulators and manufacturers are listening.
Here is the 1969 DOT document to which Perry refers–in which they indicate their intent to extend underride protection to the sides of large vehicles:
Looking forward to a lively Underride Roundtable on May 5, 2016.
What kind of underride protection would be the result of a Vision Zero Rulemaking Policy?
I was driving to Raleigh/Durham today and, shortly after I merged onto 64, a car passed me and then immediately proceeded to get back into the right lane–squeezing in front of a car and directly behind a tractor-trailer. Within less than 1/2 a mile, all three vehicles exited.
Why couldn’t the driver have waited patiently behind me and then exited?! An underride crash could so easily have occurred.
Do driver education programs teach about the dangers of truck underride? Maybe every written driver’s test should contain a question related to the avoidance of Death by Underride (when it is within one’s control).
I hope that the truck trailer manufacturing community (and those who purchase from them) take a cue from the CMTA–a non-profit organization which is supporting an effective research strategy to find treatment for Charcot-Marie-Tooth, a hereditary disorder which multiple members of my family have.
CMTA has organized a collaborative process which brings together a global interdisciplinary team:
One of the most important ways the CMTA accelerates the research process is by putting together teams of top scientists recruited from an international body of scientific and clinical Key Opinion Leaders in CMT. The STAR program’s unique character stems from the willingness of the scientists to come together to advance CMT research collaboratively, sharing and communicating ideas, discoveries and research findings.
The CMTA’s funding and operations focus is on translational research that will lead as directly as possible to therapeutic treatments of CMT. To further this goal, the CMTA has put in place a STAR Advisory Board that includes both a Scientific Expert Board and a Therapy Expert Board. The CMTA’s STAR (Strategy to Accelerate Research)
This is the kind of strategy which we hope will be taking place at, and following, the Underride Roundtable on May 5, 2016, at the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) Vehicle Research Center in Ruckersville, Virginia.
March has historically been a momentous, memorable month for truck underride safety advocacy. Not that other months are totally devoid of such activity, but I have observed a noticeable pattern:
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has studied and reported on the truck underride problem for many years. After our underride crash on May 4, 2013, we discovered that they had published a report on this issue just a few months earlier on March 14, 2013, as well as a prior report on March 1, 2011.
On the 37th anniversary of our marriage, our family launched the AnnaLeah & Mary Stand Up for Truck Safety Petition on March 19, 2014, with one of the petition requests being to improve truck underride protection (rear, side, and front on tractor trailers, as well as for Single Unit Trucks).
Later that week, on March 23, 2014, I published a Youtube video to explain why we had launched the petition and what we were asking for–including an upgrade of the weak, ineffective federal underride standards.
During the almost three years which have passed since that terribly tragic day in May, we continue to uncover new (to us) information which surely should have led to improved underride protection long before now. For example, about a month ago, I became aware of a March 16, 1977 (when I was 21–just a few days from my wedding) Senate Investigative hearing, which was reported on in the March 29, 1977 IIHS Status Report.
This is how that report began: The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has released the results of a crash test program focused on the deadly problem of car-into-truck underride crashes. Appearing as lead-off witness at a March 16 Senate Investigative hearing, the Institute’s president, William Haddon, Jr., M.D., presented crash test films and analyses showing that: The 25 year-old federal “rear end protection” standard for devices on the backs of tractor-trailers and trucks is “a sham.”
Further, Haddon warned Senators, “Blood has been shed, heads literally have rolled and countless thousands of Americans have been injured because these agencies did not act. Further inaction would be inexcusable.”
On March 5, 2016, we delivered our second petition to Washington, DC, when we took our Vision Zero Petition Book with 20,000 signatures to the Department of Transportation and President Obama. We asked for a Vision Zero Executive Order to pave the way for Vision Zero Rulemaking policies so that a truly effective and comprehensive underride standard can be issued.
On March 10, 2016, the Vision Zero Petition Book and 20,000 signatures were posted as a Public Comment on the current rear underride rulemaking.
On March 12, 2016, Jerry and I were privileged to participate in a successful side guard crash test in Hillsborough, North Carolina. This innovative side/rear combination can be retrofit to existing trucks on the road. Imagine the potential for saving lives!
On March 2, 2016, just three days prior to our recent delivery of the Vision Zero Petition, I discovered a March 19, 1969, Federal Highway Administration underride rulemaking document on the Federal Register which indicated that their intent was to extend underride protection to the sides of large vehicles! Eight years before my wedding day, when I was 13 years-old, DOT was intending to call for stronger underride protection. And yet, 44 years later, when my daughter Mary was 13 and AnnaLeah was 17, we still had not gotten it right! That’s just wrong!
It is my fervent hope that, when March2017 rolls around, we will be celebrating a vastly improved federal standard–enthusiastically and immediately adopted by the trucking industry–for all-around-the-truck underride protection at higher speeds, including now-exempt single unit trucks as well as retrofitted to existing trucks and trailers.
If this seems like a costly venture, try comparing it to the price paid by thousands upon thousands of individuals and families during the past decades of ineffective underride protection–added to the countless precious people who will be saved in the years to come from tragic, preventable death by underride.
We have been following the progress of Aaron Kiefer’s development of an innovative side/rear underride guard, which he has designed on his own time when not working as a crash reconstructionist or spending time with his family. So we eagerly welcomed his invitation to help out in his MacGyver-style crash test this past Saturday. (By the way, I am a big fan of MacGyver–watched every episode on DVD with Mary & AnnaLeah.)
Aaron wanted to take this opportunity to test his design and find out what changes might be needed to make it a marketable and affordable option for trailer owners to install as a retrofit safety improvement. We joined a crew of his family, friends, and fellow crash reconstructionists at a junkyard in the Triangle area.
The morning was for set-up. Then we took a break for some brats and chips before devoting the afternoon to three crash tests. I had been unsure before arriving as to how a pick-up could tow a car and make it crash into a trailer. It became clear to me when I saw Aaron’s pulley contraption.
Test 1 was a side crash. The collision of the car into the side guard caused the innovative side guard to pop off its brace. But, as Aaron and Jerry said, the test was successful because the side guard stopped the car from going under the trailer beyond the windshield; it prevented Passenger Compartment Intrusion (PCI). People in the car could have walked away alive.
Test 2 was a second side guard crash with the same car. Again, the car did not go under past the windshield and there was no PCI. The guard would have protected the people in the car from death and/or severe injuries. This time the added aluminum brace at the rear sheared off. Aaron thinks that he will have to go back to the drawing board and make a stronger brace.
Test 3 was a rear crash test. This time the side guard got rolled up and set aside. The trailer was turned around and the test car set up to aim at the rear of the trailer. The original rear underride guard on the trailer had actually been damaged at some point in the past and only had four of its original eight bolts. (That was the condition the underride guard was in when Aaron purchased the trailer, which had sustained damage from collision with an overpass. The guard had clearly not been properly maintained.)
In this crash, the underride guard failed and the car rode under the trailer. There was PCI and, if there had been people in the car, they would not have escaped unharmed. The added brace on the outer edge did not hold up. In fact, it was still fastened on (come to think of it, as it took a lot of work to unfasten it from the trailer afterward), but the original underride guard popped entirely off and flew to the side — doing nothing to stop the car from going under the truck.
Aaron had actually aimed the car to hit the left outer edge of the trailer, which he had reinforced with some aluminum braces. (Note: The current federal standard, as well as the proposed improved rule, does not require this area of the trailer to be protected against underride.) Instead, the car hit the vertical bar of the guard; the entire original guard then popped off and the car went under the truck.
It’s back to the drawing board for Aaron to find a way to improve his design. It was definitely a great success in that it prevented deadly side underride. On top of that, the trailer was not damaged by the collision (except for a few little nicks). But the bracing needs to be made stronger.
From what I could see, the day’s events only served to strengthen Aaron’s resolve to put a stop to senseless deaths, which he sees all-too-often in his work. I for one am truly thankful for the wonderful work he is doing, along with the group of people who willingly set aside a Saturday to support his effort.
The day gave me a deeper appreciation for all who take the time to solve the problem of preventable traffic fatalities. This includes the Virginia Tech Senior Design Team and Wabash and Manac and many researchers for decades, such as George Rechnitzer and Raphael Grzebieta in Australia and Luís Otto Faber Schmutzler in Brazil, and countless other un-named individuals.
It was also personally very intense. As one participant commented, “That was violent!”
Indeed, it was very violent. All three crashes gave me a jolt. But after the third crash, which resulted in deadly underride, I found myself standing still in the aftermath. Others were busy finding tasks to measure the results and get the clean-up started–including getting the car unstuck from under the trailer. But all I could do was stand there and stare.
Not until the next day really did it all begin to sink in: how I had witnessed from observing from afar what I and my children had gone through ourselves (although with a different crash scenario). I had watched, as an onlooker, the instantaneous destruction of a vehicle and how it was that AnnaLeah’s life had been inconceivably snuffed out in the twinkling of an eye and how, in a matter of mere seconds, Mary’s body had been broken beyond repair by just such a tragically-unresolved traffic safety problem.
It seemed like my own body experienced whiplash as it tensed up and relived, through traumatic muscle memory, what I had gone through. Meanwhile my heart continues to break with the grief that knows no end even as I process this experience.
It is beyond my comprehension how we, in this country, can allow such things to occur year after year without moving heaven and earth to learn how to prevent these tragedies. I can only ask forgiveness, and apologize to the countless families who have lost loved ones through violent death by motor vehicle, for letting them down–for not addressing it as the priority it should be. As a society, we have dropped the ball.
Jerry said several times, “It’s not every day you get to see a dream become a reality–kind of a humbling experience actually.” May there be many more such days.
When we met with DOT policy officials on March 4, we found that we were in agreement on a very important perspective regarding crash fatality causes and solutions: What we need to be addressing is not one thing or another, e.g., improve underride guards OR develop crash avoidance technology. No, no, no. It is not a case of either/or. It is definitely both/and!
Our crash was not an accident and many factors were involved in what came about that day. They all need to be addressed.
My heart is broken and anything less than genuine pursuit of every avenue for safety advancement only serves to deepen the pain.
AnnaLeah, Mary, Marcus, and Vanessa, Spring 2012, Grafa Park, Midland, Texas
Weeping Willow Memories: Mary and AnnaLeah enjoyed a spring-like day in the winter of 2009 at Grafa Park in Midland, Texas. The branches of a weeping willow tree became the setting for the unleashing of their imagination. (Preserved for us by their sister, Susanna Karth)
Well, now I have found out about an interesting requirement for regulatory rulemaking related to safety standards.
“National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Public Law 104– 113, Section 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272), directs agencies to use voluntary consensus standards in regulatory activities unless doing so would be inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards (e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standard bodies, such as SAE. NTTAA directs agencies to provide Congress explanations when they decide not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards.” TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH CIRCULAR E-C117 The Domain of Truck and Bus Safety Research
Now here’s a question: How would the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act be interpreted and applied in the case of underride regulatory standards?
First, let’s look at an example related to seat belt assembly compliance testing:
The agency identified an ISO technical report (TR 1417-1974) and an SAE International standard (J384, Rev. JUN94) that have testing recommendations for vehicle seat belt anchorages. Both recommend the use of body blocks, similar to those currently specified in FMVSS No. 210, for applying the required test loads. The alternative strategy the agency is now considering in this SNPRM would continue the use of the FMVSS No. 210 body blocks. Accordingly, the alternative strategy employing the current body blocks is consistent with the ISO report and SAE standard. However, NHTSA has tentatively determined that the ISO report and SAE standard, among other matters, do not specify the positioning of the body blocks referenced in both with sufficient specificity to achieve the goals of this rulemaking. Thus, NHTSA has decided to base this SNPRM on the existing FMVSS No. 210 body blocks rather than explore using new ones, and to develop possible test procedures that make clear how the body blocks are to be positioned during FMVSS No. 210 compliance testing. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages
Now, let’s look at what the current proposed underride rule for rear impact protection on trailers says:
This NPRM proposes to adopt requirements of CMVSS No. 223, as discussed later in this section. NHTSA’s consideration of CMVSS No. 223 accords with the principles of NTTAA, in that NHTSA is considering an established, proven standard, and has not had to expend significant agency resources on the same safety need addressed by CMVSS No. 223. Rear Impact Guards, Rear Impact Protection,
So, does this mean that NHTSA is choosing to adopt an existing underride standard (Canadian’s rear underride standard) rather than explore existing or future research, or standards from other countries, which might prove that stronger, more effective guards could be manufactured and thus save more lives?
Pourquoi? What would qualify as “available and applicable voluntary consensus standards”? Is this an attempt to avoid having to provide Congress, through OMB, with an explanation? If so, would they have to give an explanation for:
Why they decide to use standards not already being implemented elsewhere? OR
Why they decide not to use proven underride technology?
And what does ” inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical” mean? Is this an insurmountable barrier? For example, does “impractical” refer to the cost/benefit analysis restrictions of Executive Order 12866 which we are asking to be addressed with a Vision Zero Executive Order?
I’m confused. Can this Technology & Transfer Act allow us to make use of advances in technology? Can we not move beyond what someone else has already used as a regulatory standard? Why would we settle for less than the best?
Here’s to hoping this question can get addressed and that the upcoming Underride Roundtable at IIHS on May 5, 2016, will serve as a “voluntary consensus standard body” to clearly and definitively delineate state-of-the-art technical voluntary consensus standards to provide the best possible underride protection in the whole wide world!
And call it the Dragon Underride Protector in honor of my son (who suggested that name and who, as a passenger, endured the same truck/car crash as his sisters and witnessed their deaths due to underride) and in memory of his sisters, AnnaLeah (forever 17) and Mary (13).
I am having a difficult time getting this post started. I shared about it briefly here and Russell Mokhiber graciously shared our story as well. Now I want to give a more in-depth report of our trip to Washington, DC, on March 3 and 4 to deliver over 20,000 Vision Zero Petitions. I want to be able to report that I am hopeful about the impact of our Vision Zero Petition. But I am mostly frustrated and angry.
There were some encouraging meetings with legislative offices. But there were no commitments, no promises of action to be taken. Traffic safety is not high on their list of priorities. And, despite the almost 33,000 traffic crash deaths in our country each year, Traffic Safety/Vision Zero is not even on the list of Issues on whitehouse.gov.
During our time in Washington, after sharing the story of our crash time after time, we got into a discussion with someone who has observed and testified about the underride crash problem countless times. We actually ended up, as a result, getting hold of some photos of the underride guard which failed to guard our car from riding under the trailer in front of us when another truck hit us and spun us around and hit us again backwards into that truck. We had not previously seen those photos.
And they were disturbing–adding fuel to the fire of my frustration at the utter lack of genuine responsibility on anyone’s part to protect us from Death by Underride. And that includes the three branches of our government: Legislative; Executive/Administrative; and Judicial.
In fact, while we were in Washington on March 3 and 4, we made the rounds of the Legislative branch–visiting with Senator Johnny Isakson (R-GA) as well as staff of several other legislators. I am not putting much stock in them taking immediate positive action to advance traffic safety. But we have knocked on those doors and appreciate the time they took to listen to us. We will continue to follow up with our contacts and ask them to stand up with us for safety.
Additionally, we have petitioned the Executive branch–both through President Obama and the White House, as well as the administrative arm of DOT/NHTSA. Though, of course, I think that the problem needs to be addressed inter-departmentally to acknowledge and address traffic fatalities and serious injuries as a public health and labor problem, as well as transportation, through a White House Vision Zero Task Force.
We delivered the 20,000+ Vision Zero Petition signatures both in the form of the Vision Zero Petition Book to each DOT policy official with whom we met and via a binder with all of the signatures and the letter to Secretary Foxx (the latter printed for us by the Care2 Petition Site).
Director Donovan, Office of Management & Budget (OMB)
Secretary Foxx, Department of Transportation
Administrator Rosekind, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
Administrator Darling, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA).
With President Obama’s copy of the Vision Zero Petition Book, we enclosed a letter which our granddaughter had decided that she wanted to write to the president when she saw the stack of books at our house and asked what we were going to do with them. Here is her letter (dictated to me):
(I thought it was interesting that Vanessa’s drawings of her aunts had no mouths. In fact, it is all-too-true that they cannot speak up on their own behalf. Also, she wanted to see photos of AnnaLeah and Mary to make sure that she got their hair and eye color correct.)
We talked with DOT policy officials about our petition in which we pleaded, along with over 20,000 other individuals, that they address the extensive traffic safety and public health problem of crash fatalities and serious injuries. At an average of 33,000 crash deaths each year, Death by Motor Vehicle is one of the leading causes of death. We requested that they adopt a Vision Zero Rulemaking Policy and that they seek such authority from the White House through action from President Obama, whom we are asking to:
Set a National Vision Zero Goal.
Establish a White House Vision Zero Task Force to guide us in achieving that goal as a nation.
Sign a Vision Zero Executive Order to ensure that DOT can adopt Vision Zero rulemaking policies, which would allow them to issue and enforce rules and safety standards that genuinely protect human life.
Blair Anderson, Byron Bloch, Andy Young, Bryna Helfer, Jerry Karth, Marianne Karth, John Lannen, Isaac Karth
Included in our Petition Letter to Secretary Foxx was our request that they apply such a rulemaking policy specifically in two ways–which will address two safety problems of particular concern to us, as well as set the stage for more effectively addressing countless other traffic safety issues. These are the three petition requests:
1. Change rulemaking policy to move away from a cost/benefit model and adopt a more humanistic, rational Vision Zero safety strategy model which will impact all DOT safety regulations;
2. Apply Vision Zero principles initiating rulemaking to require forward collision avoidance and mitigation braking on all new large trucks; and
3. Apply Vision Zero principles by requiring crash test-based performance standards for truck side and rear underride guards.
Due to the circumstances of our crash, we have a particular interest in promoting the improvement of underride protection on trucks so that–upon the collision of a smaller vehicle with a truck–the geometrical mismatch of the two does not lead to the smaller vehicle riding under the truck so that the truck itself intrudes into the passengers’ survivable space. In simple terms, our goal is to bring an end to what should be survivable crashes but which all-too-often lead to horrific injuries and tragic death.
It is our observation and conclusion, based upon investigation into the facts that, whether DOT is actually hampered by a previous Executive Order (12866) or merely assumed to be so, NHTSA generally issues rules that are less stringent than what existing technology has shown to be possible (read that: weak and ineffective).
It was for that reason that we have petitioned for a Vision Zero Executive Order and specifically discussed with DOT policy officials, on March 4, 2016, the preferable means of analyzing the pros and cons of a proposed rule through Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) vs the more-commonly used Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)–which assigns an economic value to human life.
At least it appeared to me that DOT intends to keep their promise to deliver the Petition Books for us. At the end of our meeting, they asked me to sign each book with a personal message to the recipient. I gladly did so, asking them to consider our petition for the sake of AnnaLeah and Mary.
Speaking of AnnaLeah and Mary. . . this gets me back to my earlier reference to our particular crash, which was, of course, due to the failure (for whatever reason) of a truck driver to maintain lane and hitting our car so that it went backwards under another truck. Because the underride guard failed to do its intended job, Mary and AnnaLeah experienced an untimely and unnatural end to their lives.
My question is: Should someone be held accountable for the failure of that federally-required piece of equipment which resulted in two deaths? Is the manufacturer liable to prevent someone from being killed when they collide with a truck? And, mind you, expecting them to do so would not be some pie-in-the-sky kind of expectation. It has been proven that protection is possible from much worse circumstances than are currently required.
Yet, the Judicial third branch of the government has provided little hope for ensuring that the truck/trailer manufacturer will be held responsible for the failure of their product, upon collision with it, to prevent horrible, unnecessary death. I have been reminded of that unfortunate reality again this week as the topic came up again related to our crash.
In fact, upon a simple search of the internet, I found this example of the difficulty of pinning liability upon the manufacturer:
Defendant . . . avers that despite the truth of these facts, it owed no duty to persons such as plaintiff’s decedent who crash into the rear of its trailers. . . . maintains that there is no duty to design, manufacture and sell a trailer which is “accident-proof” that is, able to protect “invaders” or “trespassers” who run into the trailer and later seek legal redress U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama – 816 F. Supp. 1525 (M.D. Ala. 1993) March 26, 1993.
What?! So there you have it. At least some manufacturers are willing to fight for their right to avoid ethical responsibility for designing their product to be safe to travel around.
the manufacturer is obliged to secure the occupants of only its vehicle from that foreseeable harm: the manufacturer does not owe a duty to protect those who collide with its vehicle. See Mieher, 301 N.E.2d at 308-10; but see id. at 310-11 (Goldenhersh, J. dissenting) (arguing that the duty of care should extend to prevent unreasonable risk to occupants, other drivers, and pedestrians).
In my mind, the question remains: Does the manufacturer owe travelers on the road the duty to exercise reasonable care in designing its motor vehicle?
One author takes a look at this question:
Does a vehicle manufacturer owe a duty to design a vehicle with which it is safe to collide? The Illinois Supreme Court said no in the case of an underride accident, where one vehicle rear-ended a truck and proceeded unimpeded under its bed. The decision unleashed an ongoing debate over the concept of “enhanced injury,” where a manufacturer can be liable for defects in its vehicle that cause injuries over and above those that would have occurred from the accident but for a defective design.Illinois vehicle manufacturers have no duty to protect non-occupants who collide with their vehicles
As it stands, it appears to me that, in general, the manufacturing community is prone to protect themselves from legal impunity rather than protect travelers on the road. I would welcome the opportunity to hear differently.
So, how then do we bring about a more responsible solution to this solvable underride problem? In addition to considering how we might impact each of the three branches of our government, we have also sought for, and encouraged, voluntary action on the part of truck/trailer manufacturers–which has met with some limited success. For the most part, the manufacturers tend to take a wait-and-see attitude–particularly when NHTSA is in the midst of rulemaking–rather than take the initiative to simply go ahead and design the best possible protection.
We have worked with the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) and the Truck Safety Coalition (TSC) to bring all interested parties together in an Underride Roundtable this Spring when, on May 5, 2016, we will attempt to cooperatively address this problem–for the sake of all travelers–in memory of those who have already lost their lives needlessly and for those of us who are vulnerable to being the next potential victim of a “roving guillotine.”
In fact, when we were in Washington this week, we met at IIHS with some of the members of the planning group for the Underride Roundtable (Russ Rader, IIHS; John Lannen, TSC, Andy Young, truck litigation attorney/truck driver/truck company owner; Jerry, Isaac, and myself)–taking the opportunity to get some work done in person. One of the ideas, which we were throwing around when brainstorming about how to shape our Panel Discussion, was the need for creating Best Practices for Underride Protection and re-visiting the issue on an ongoing basis.
Byron Bloch had joined us for the meeting. One suggestion he made, during our Roundtable planning meeting, was that IIHS, who is well-known for that crash rating safety program for the automotive industry, develop a 5-Star Crash Rating Program for truck/trailer manufacturers as well.
That idea has grabbed our attention. After all, the IIHS crash testing of various major trailer manufacturers prior to our crash and continuing in the years following, was a source of revelation to us about the extent of the underride problem and the reality that it was/is a solvable problem.
Furthermore, as I continue to observe the crash testing of passenger vehicles, no matter how safe those vehicles are manufactured, their crashworthiness features are compromised and prevented from going into action when the vehicle collides with a larger vehicle and rides under it. In other words, auto safety improvements are compromised due to a truck safety flaw.
How about a cycle be set up–Jerry suggested this morning–for crash testing of trucks/trailers to assess the success of advances in underride protection? This would provide a means of reliable, comparative, and ongoing feedback to the manufacturers, as well as the buyers of trailers and single unit trucks, government officials, researcher engineers, safety advocates, attorneys, crash reconstructionists, injury prevention specialists, and travelers on the road.
I ask the question again: How will we address this problem of Death by Underride?
Due to the complexity of the issue, no one is currently held accountable, responsible, or liable for preventing these deaths which occur upon collision of a passenger vehicle with a larger commercial motor vehicle. Remember, we are not talking here about who was to blame for the collision occurring in the first place.
Can we possibly find our way to work together in our great nation through the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of our government–in a cooperative, concerted effort with private industry, research engineers, safety advocates, and the insurance industry– to bring about the best possible protection for We the People?
Can we agree to share the costs of what the solution will require so that the burden of the problem is shifted from the victims, who experience life needlessly cut short or devastatingly changed by horrific injuries, and their families who are faced with unexpected, traumatic, too-often-bitter, and unending grief?
Right this minute, I must admit, I am discouraged right along with the many others who have tried to bring about change for decades. Nonetheless, I choose to remain hopeful that this is not insurmountable and that we are well on our way to victory as we continue to shed light on traffic safety problems and call for truth, justice, and mercy to prevail.
Jerry, Marianne, and Isaac in front of DOTAndy Young, Marianne Karth, Jerry Karth, John Lannen
(Note: All viewpoints expressed above are mine alone and are not meant to imply agreement by any individuals who may have been mentioned. Whether the analysis of the issues at hand are accurate–or unfairly tainted by the emotions of this grieving mother–are left to the reader to ferret out. Marianne Karth, March 6, 2016)
