“Given that Australia has adopted a ‘Vision Zero’ road safety philosophy and the ‘Safe System Approach’ road safety strategy, all such foreseen fatalities need to be addressed if a design countermeasure can be implemented.
“The U.S. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has also identified that the truck underrun fatalities and serious injuries are occurring as a result of inadequate truck underrun barriers and the lack of a crash performance test standard (IIHS 2014). They have rated a number of underrun barriers using a performance crash test protocol they recently developed.”
Clearly, they get it: if a fatality is predictable, and a solution exists which could prevent it, then it should be implemented!
The Department of Transportation collects statistics from crash reports given to them by each state on fatalities each year. I requested a chart of those crash deaths related to truck underride since they began collecting that information.
Unfortunately, it does not contain a breakdown of rear vs side vs front collisions. Also, there is a column for Passenger “Compartment Intrusion Unknown.” Our crash was listed as this category in the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). However, there clearly was intrusion into the passenger compartment where AnnaLeah and Mary were sitting.
It makes me wonder how many PCI crashes are underreported. These statistics are taken from the police crash reports and it would be helpful if all states were provided with, and required to use, a uniform report form in order to make reporting and research more efficient and effective.
I was driving to Raleigh/Durham today and, shortly after I merged onto 64, a car passed me and then immediately proceeded to get back into the right lane–squeezing in front of a car and directly behind a tractor-trailer. Within less than 1/2 a mile, all three vehicles exited.
Why couldn’t the driver have waited patiently behind me and then exited?! An underride crash could so easily have occurred.
Do driver education programs teach about the dangers of truck underride? Maybe every written driver’s test should contain a question related to the avoidance of Death by Underride (when it is within one’s control).
The Virginia Tech Senior Student Design Team, which was inspired to take on the goal of designing a better truck underride guard, presented the results of their Spring Midterm Report last week.
I hope that the truck trailer manufacturing community (and those who purchase from them) take a cue from the CMTA–a non-profit organization which is supporting an effective research strategy to find treatment for Charcot-Marie-Tooth, a hereditary disorder which multiple members of my family have.
CMTA has organized a collaborative process which brings together a global interdisciplinary team:
One of the most important ways the CMTA accelerates the research process is by putting together teams of top scientists recruited from an international body of scientific and clinical Key Opinion Leaders in CMT. The STAR program’s unique character stems from the willingness of the scientists to come together to advance CMT research collaboratively, sharing and communicating ideas, discoveries and research findings.
The CMTA’s funding and operations focus is on translational research that will lead as directly as possible to therapeutic treatments of CMT. To further this goal, the CMTA has put in place a STAR Advisory Board that includes both a Scientific Expert Board and a Therapy Expert Board. The CMTA’s STAR (Strategy to Accelerate Research)
This is the kind of strategy which we hope will be taking place at, and following, the Underride Roundtable on May 5, 2016, at the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) Vehicle Research Center in Ruckersville, Virginia.
IIHS was reporting on a meeting that took place on March 16, 1977 — three days before I got married! That’s almost 39 years ago — long before any of my 9 children were born, let alone my two youngest daughters, AnnaLeah and Mary!
The government and industry apparently didn’t get underride rulemaking right then! And they clearly hadn’t gotten it right by May 4, 2013 — when Mary and AnnaLeah died from truck underride! But they better watch out, because I am not going to sit by and watch while thousands more die for no good reason!
See the testimony in May 2009 by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, in which they call for tougher underride guard standards and with an attachment of the history of federal rulemaking on underride guards (pasted below): http://tinyurl.com/phlaqon
“The history of Federal rulemaking on truck underride guards:
1953 Interstate Commerce Commission adopts rule requiring rear underride guards on trucks and trailers but sets no strength requirements.
1967 National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB), predecessor to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), indicates it will develop a standard for truck underride guards.
1969 NHSB indicates it will conduct research on heavy vehicle underride guard configurations to provide data for the preparation of a standard. In the same year the Federal Highway Administration publishes a proposal to require trailers and trucks to have strong rear-end structures extending to within 18 inches of the road surface.
1970 NHSB says it would be “impracticable” for manufacturers to engineer improved underride protectors into new vehicles before 1972. The agency considers an effective date of January 1, 1974 for requiring underride guards with energy-absorbing features as opposed to rigid barriers.
1971 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommends that NHTSA require energy-absorbing underride and override barriers on trucks, buses, and trailers. Later in the same year NHTSA abandons its underride rulemaking, saying it has “no control over the vehicles after they are sold” and “it can only be assumed that certain operators will remove the underride guard.” The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS), predecessor to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, considers a regulatory change that would prohibit alteration of manufacturer-installed equipment. This would nullify the major reason NHTSA cited for abandoning the proposed underride standard.
1972 NTSB urges NHTSA to renew the abandoned underride proposal.
1974 US Secretary of Transportation says deaths in cars that underride trucks would have to quadruple before underride protection would be considered cost beneficial.
1977 IIHS testifies before the Consumer Subcommittee of the US Senate Commerce Committee, noting that devices to stop underride have been technologically available for years. IIHS tests demonstrate that a crash at less than 30 mph of a subcompact car into a guard meeting current requirements results in severe underride. IIHS also demonstrates the feasibility of effective underride guards that do not add significant weight to trucks. IIHS petitions NHTSA to initiate rulemaking to establish a rear underride standard. The agency agrees to reassess the need for such a standard and later in the year announces plans to require more effective rear underride protection. BMCS publishes a new but weak proposal regarding underride protection.
1981 NHTSA issues a proposal to require upgraded underride protection.
1986 IIHS study reveals that rear guards designed to prevent cars from underriding trucks appear to be working well on British rigs.
1987 European underride standard is shown to reduce deaths caused by underride crashes.
1996 NHTSA finally issues a new standard, effective 1998.”
Mariolani, J., Schmutzler, L., Arruda, A., Occhipinti, S. et al., “Impact Project: Searching for Solution to the Underride Problem,” SAE Technical Paper 982755, 1998, doi:10.4271/982755.
“Rear underride crashes kill thousands of people yearly worldwide. Underride guards did not follow the progress achieved by the automotive safety technology. . .”
“Basically controlling risk during crashes is an energy-management problem. Our knowledge and understanding of energy management today is a lot better than it was in 1998. And in 1998, it was a lot better than it was in 1988.”
From a 2009 research article, “The effect of state regulations on truck-crash fatalities.“:
“Truck-length limitations reduced fatalities in crashes involving large trucks. Our model estimates suggested that if all states had adopted a speed limit of 55 miles per hour for all vehicles in 2005, an additional 561 fatalities would have been averted.”
Jeremy Finley, Investigative Reporter from Nashville, Tennessee, sheds light on the problem with NHTSA’s proposed rule for underride guards on tractor-trailers. He discusses our crash.
