From the Vision Zero Petition. . . a comment from signer #15,929
D. J. Young
11 hours ago
OH
“For a free and democratic society, Vision Zero is a moral obligation. For our leaders to tolerate 33,000 traffic-related deaths and untold disabling injuries per year is a national tragedy. None of these people should have been discarded through the application of a flawed cost-benefit analysis approach to highway safety policy. Please help every person have a safe drive home.”
32,719 people died in U.S. traffic crashes in 2013. Two of those people were my daughters, AnnaLeah (17) and Mary (13). That number decreased to 32,675 deaths in 2014–down by 44, but still far too many deaths in my book. In fact, early estimates show 2015 trending higher.
And how many of those deaths were due to truck underride and could have been prevented by a stronger, more effective underride protection system? Underride deaths are preventable and unnecessary and now is the time to take extreme action to reduce these deaths–no matter who caused the crash!
I survived a horrific truck crash in which our car was pushed by a truck into the rear of another truck. Backwards. My daughters in the back seat were not so fortunate; they went under the truck and the truck broke their innocent bodies.
The underride problem is just one example of the fixable problems we need to address. Michael Lemov has written an eye-opener, Car Safety Wars: One Hundred Years of Technology, Politics, and Death in which he tells us that in the more than 110 years since the first traffic crash in 1898, more than 3.5 million Americans have been killed and more than 300,000,000 injured in motor vehicle crashes [p.9]. This, I learned, is 3x the number of Americans who have been killed and 200x the number wounded in all of the wars fought by our nation since the Revolution [p.10]. Imagine.
Worldwide it was estimated that 1.2 million people were killed and 50 million more were injured in motor vehicle collisions in 2004.[2] Also in 2010 alone, around 1.23 million people were killed due to traffic collisions.[3]This makes motor vehicle collisions the leading cause of deathamong children 10–19 years of age (260,000 children die a year, 10 million are injured)[4] and the sixth leading preventable cause of death in the United States[5] (45,800 people died and 2.4 million were injured in 2005).[6] It is estimated that motor vehicle collisions caused the deaths of around 60 million people during the 20th century,[7] around the same as the number of World War II casualties.
Lemov’s book sheds light on many things including the fact that, although the blame was often put on the driver for crashes in the 20th century, in fact crashes and crash deaths are additionally caused by other factors including environmental and vehicle factors. He uses a term which I had never heard before–post-crash injury or “second collision.” He describes it this way: ”
It is the collision of the occupants of a vehicle with its interior, or the road, after the initial impact of a car crash. Ultimately the creativity of a few scientists, doctors, and investigators. . . developed an understanding of what actually happens to a human body in a car crash. . . Researchers gradually developed ideas they hoped would prevent this second collision. [p.16]
We can thank these researchers for paving the way for improved vehicle safety, including things like seat belts, air bags, and even car seats that lock in position. But, for far too long, it has been a major battle –as Lemov says, a car safety war — to bring about changes which will save lives.
Our own crash demonstrated the many factors which can contribute to the occurrence of crashes as well as to the deaths and horrific injuries which too often occur as a result. We learned the hard way that many of these are preventable and that Our Crash Was Not An Accident.
Following that, we worked to promote underride research and have helped to organize an international Underride Roundtable on Thursday, May 5, 2016, when researchers, government officials, and industry leaders will gather to discuss truck underride crashes and how to reduce the risks for passenger vehicle occupants, bicyclists, and pedestrians. We will explore the scope of the problem and how regulation and voluntary action can help address it. There will also be a demonstration of underride guard performance in a crash test.
I learned that one of the biggest obstacles was that public policy and more specifically DOT rulemaking is impacted by a requirement for cost/benefit analysis which tips the scale in the favor of industry lobby and the almighty dollar and makes a mockery out of the word safety. Human life becomes devalued in the process when a safety measure is rejected because it “may not have significant safety consequence.”
This is illustrated in the history of Federal rulemaking on truck underride guards outlined by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, where it was indicated that in
1974: US Secretary of Transportation says deaths in cars that underride trucks would have to quadruple before underride protection would be considered cost beneficial.
I determined to battle such an inconceivable, incomprehensible, and unconscionable attitude and determined to find a better way to protect travelers on the road. After talking with numerous engineers who either were convinced that safer underride guards could be made or had already designed ones, I also discovered a global movement that calls for the reduction of crash deaths and serious injuries: Vision Zero – An ethical approach to safety and mobility.
Why are we devoting our lives to pushing for a DOT Vision Zero policy? Because I truly believe that it can have an impact not just on truck safety but on all issues related to highway and auto safety–including auto safety defects, driver training requirements, all kinds of impaired driving (including distracted driving, drunk driving, and driving while fatigued), and proven national traffic safety standards which should be adopted by all states.
Add your voice to ours! Sign & share our Vision Zero Petition. Help us persuade President Obama to set a National Vision Zero Goal & to sign a Vision Zero Executive Order which will allow DOT to adopt a Vision Zero rulemaking policy.
We are taking these petitions (almost 16,000 signatures to date) to Washington, DC, on March 4, where we will be meeting with DOT policy officials to discuss the need for this radical change in how our nation protects the travelers on our roads.
It is time to stop acting like the value of a human life can be measured with and compared to corporate $$$. Every delay costs someone their life.
Let’s get it right, America. Somebody’s life depends on it. Lots of somebodies.
In order to move the United States Towards Zero Crash Deaths, I am asking President Obama to first set a National Vision Zero Goal and then to write a memorandum which would establish a National White House Task Force to actually make things happen to reduce crash deaths across the roads of our country.
Here is my idea for what a Vision Zero Task Force would look like:
IIHS was reporting on a meeting that took place on March 16, 1977 — three days before I got married! That’s almost 39 years ago — long before any of my 9 children were born, let alone my two youngest daughters, AnnaLeah and Mary!
The government and industry apparently didn’t get underride rulemaking right then! And they clearly hadn’t gotten it right by May 4, 2013 — when Mary and AnnaLeah died from truck underride! But they better watch out, because I am not going to sit by and watch while thousands more die for no good reason!
See the testimony in May 2009 by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, in which they call for tougher underride guard standards and with an attachment of the history of federal rulemaking on underride guards (pasted below): http://tinyurl.com/phlaqon
“The history of Federal rulemaking on truck underride guards:
1953 Interstate Commerce Commission adopts rule requiring rear underride guards on trucks and trailers but sets no strength requirements.
1967 National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB), predecessor to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), indicates it will develop a standard for truck underride guards.
1969 NHSB indicates it will conduct research on heavy vehicle underride guard configurations to provide data for the preparation of a standard. In the same year the Federal Highway Administration publishes a proposal to require trailers and trucks to have strong rear-end structures extending to within 18 inches of the road surface.
1970 NHSB says it would be “impracticable” for manufacturers to engineer improved underride protectors into new vehicles before 1972. The agency considers an effective date of January 1, 1974 for requiring underride guards with energy-absorbing features as opposed to rigid barriers.
1971 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommends that NHTSA require energy-absorbing underride and override barriers on trucks, buses, and trailers. Later in the same year NHTSA abandons its underride rulemaking, saying it has “no control over the vehicles after they are sold” and “it can only be assumed that certain operators will remove the underride guard.” The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (BMCS), predecessor to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, considers a regulatory change that would prohibit alteration of manufacturer-installed equipment. This would nullify the major reason NHTSA cited for abandoning the proposed underride standard.
1972 NTSB urges NHTSA to renew the abandoned underride proposal.
1974 US Secretary of Transportation says deaths in cars that underride trucks would have to quadruple before underride protection would be considered cost beneficial.
1977 IIHS testifies before the Consumer Subcommittee of the US Senate Commerce Committee, noting that devices to stop underride have been technologically available for years. IIHS tests demonstrate that a crash at less than 30 mph of a subcompact car into a guard meeting current requirements results in severe underride. IIHS also demonstrates the feasibility of effective underride guards that do not add significant weight to trucks. IIHS petitions NHTSA to initiate rulemaking to establish a rear underride standard. The agency agrees to reassess the need for such a standard and later in the year announces plans to require more effective rear underride protection. BMCS publishes a new but weak proposal regarding underride protection.
1981 NHTSA issues a proposal to require upgraded underride protection.
1986 IIHS study reveals that rear guards designed to prevent cars from underriding trucks appear to be working well on British rigs.
1987 European underride standard is shown to reduce deaths caused by underride crashes.
1996 NHTSA finally issues a new standard, effective 1998.”
Mariolani, J., Schmutzler, L., Arruda, A., Occhipinti, S. et al., “Impact Project: Searching for Solution to the Underride Problem,” SAE Technical Paper 982755, 1998, doi:10.4271/982755.
“Rear underride crashes kill thousands of people yearly worldwide. Underride guards did not follow the progress achieved by the automotive safety technology. . .”
“Basically controlling risk during crashes is an energy-management problem. Our knowledge and understanding of energy management today is a lot better than it was in 1998. And in 1998, it was a lot better than it was in 1988.”
Roger Lanctot points to the increase in traffic fatalities in 2015 and raises timely questions:
“Nothing focuses peoples’ attention quite as effectively as death and there’s been a lot of it on U.S. highways lately. Preliminary figures released this week by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reveal that for the first nine months of 2015 traffic fatalities increased 9.3%. . .
“NHTSA’s current policies and procedures enable too much bargaining, delay and backsliding and car companies have not been cooperative. . .
“It may be time for NHTSA to step up its data reporting requirements, thereby giving car makers an excuse for gathering more data while setting the stage for improved processes for mitigating the 100-fatalities-a-day carnage on U.S. roads. Sharing a little data seems like a small price to pay to solve a big problem.
“Increased and improved data sharing, aggregation and analysis is sweeping the car industry. It’s time for NHTSA to get in on the action – in the interest of saving lives.”
Our family will be delivering the almost 16,000 Vision Zero petition signatures to Washington, D.C., on Friday, March 4, 2016. At that time, we will meet with Department of Transportation policy officials to discuss our concerns and requests.
One month from now, when we head out to D.C. , we will be closing the petition. Before that happens, please help us to get as many signatures as possible.
The Vision Zero Petition Book will contain the almost 16,000 petition signatures & all comments. It will be delivered in print form and also available digitally.
Together we can call for
aNational Vision Zero Goal: Towards Zero Crash Deaths & Serious Injuries!
Aaron Kiefer is making plans to do a preliminary crash test of his innovative side/rear underride protection system – before taking it to the Underride Roundtable at the IIHS on May 5, 2016.
He has asked us to be on the lookout for two things which he needs for the crash test:
a used 53′ box trailer with its rear underride guard and its landing gear intact (not bent or rusted) and
an older model Chevy Malibu–from the year 2000 or younger.
If you have either one of those which you could donate (or sell for almost nothing) to make this important crash happen, please email me atmarianne@annaleahmary.com.
Here is more information about Aaron’s hard work to make trucks safer to be around:
Aaron plans on using the crash test results to refine his design and make it as effective as possible. Please spread the word about this need. Thank you.
I am hard put to think of a better way to show the opposite, of what we are asking Obama and Foxx to do with our Vision Zero petitions, than what is being suggested here:
According to this article, Cass Sunstein apparently is encouraging the increase of cost/benefit analysis at the price of costly delays in needed safety regulations. Cost in terms of lost human lives.
We, on the other hand, are calling for suspension of overdependence on the cost/benefit analysis process–if it leads to delays and blockage of safety regulations which have been proven to save lives.
After I discussed this concern with another safety advocate, he suggested the alternative approach of cost-effectiveness analysis vs cost/benefit analysis. I have taken a quick look at a description of it online and will be thinking about it further.
“Cost–effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a form of economic analysis that compares the relative costs and outcomes (effects) of two or more courses of action. Cost–effectiveness analysis is distinct from cost–benefit analysis, which assigns a monetary value to the measure of effect.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost-effectiveness_analysis
My question is, “Would such an approach lead to a reduction in crash deaths & serious injuries?” In other words, would it further the goal of Vision Zero? Towards Zero.