Category Archives: Safety Advocacy

Imagine an Executive Order propelling us toward zero crash deaths. What are we waiting for?

Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, , ,
When I read Lou Lombardo’s Care for Crash Victims email this morning, it reminded me of what I keep thinking about the proposed underride rule. . . the regulatory analysis needs to include the cost of the lives lost (and injuries sustained) in the past — all the years of too-weak or non-existent guards even when they knew that better could be made — and all the lives which could be saved into the future.
What conclusions would the analysts then draw? Would they deem spilled blood too great a price to pay?

Dear Care For Crash Victims Community Members:

As we think about Benefits and Costs we need to think about Who gets the Benefits and Who gets the Costs.  People’s lives vs. Corporate monies.

 

Think about the power of Presidents and their responsibilities as OMB is a key arm of government in the White House.
 

See OMB Draft Report at

Imagine an Executive Order directing the Justice Department to require all settlement agreements to include payments to the government commensurate with the costs in lives lost in the past and projected into the future – and the benefits of sentencing executives to the elimination of vehicle violence forevermore – Vision Zero. 
 
Lou
Thanks, Lou, for your always-thoughtful questions and comments.
Adopt a Vision Zero Policy 047

A Bereaved Dad Takes a Close Look at the Flaws in Underride Regulatory Cost/Benefit Analysis

Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, , , ,

Jerry Karth submitted some additional comments on the proposed underride rule–with reflections on what was learned through the Underride Roundtable. These comments have now been posted on the Federal Register: Additional Comments on Underride Rulemaking by Jerry Karth, May 19, 2016

Jerry submitted his original public comment regarding the proposed underride rulemaking on February 16, 2016. Here is an excerpt from that which addresses NHTSA’s preliminary cost/benefit analysis:

I would like to respond to the utilitarian logic approach that NHTSA has appeared to have applied to this issue. Their utilization of a cost/benefit analysis (called for by Executive Order 12866) is sadly lacking moral and ethical depth on the benefits side.

This type of logic was applied in 2000 by the Philip Morris Company in the Czech Republic when they funded a research study on the costs/benefits of smoking in the Czech Republic. http://www.mindfully.org/Industry/Philip-Morris-Czech-Study.htm The study concluded that it would be more beneficial for the people of the Czech Republic to smoke than not. What was this startling conclusion based on? A cost/benefit analysis.

The results are summarized in Figure 1:

Figure 1: The public finance balance of smoking in the Czech Republic in 1999 is estimated at +5,815 mil. CZK

Income and positive external effects 21,463 mil CZK
  Savings on housing for elderly 28,mil CZK
  Pension & soc. expenses savings due to early mortality 196 mil CZK
  Health care costs savings due to early mortality 968 mil CZK
  Customs duty 354 mil CZK
  Corporate income tax 747 mil CZK
  VAT 3,521 mil CZK
  Excise tax 15,648 mil CZK
Smoking related public finance costs 15,647 mil CZK
  Fire induced costs 49 mil CZK
  Lost income tax due to higher mortality 1,367 mil CZK
  Days out of work related public finance costs 1,667 mil CZK
  ETS related health care costs 1,142 mil CZK
  Smoking (first hand) related health care costs 11,422 mil CZK
NET BALANCE +5,815 mil. CZK

The study concluded that $1,227 was saved in pensions, health care, and housing every time a smoker dies. [Photo and caption from http://www.mindfully.org/Industry/Philip-Morris-Czech-Study.htm ]

$1,227 ?

That’s how much a study sponsored by Philip Morris said the Czech Republic saves on health care, pensions and housing every time a smoker dies.

photo: American Cancer Society full-page SF Chronicle advertisement 2aug01


In comparison, let’s look at how this approach could be applied to the underride issue. This type of cost/benefit analysis could lead us to conclude that it is not beneficial to require stronger underride guards because the benefits of keeping weak and ineffective standards for underride guards are greater than the cost of upgrading them to the best possible protection. What might those benefits be?

  1. Save the trucking industry money by holding down manufacturing and installation costs.
  2. Save the consumer money by holding down shipping costs.
  3. Reduce medical costs by killing people at a younger age (and avoiding costly medical costs of the elderly population).
  4. Preserve the Social Security fund by decreasing the number of people who draw from their account due to early Death by Motor Vehicle.
  5. Improve the job market due to the decrease in the workforce from the elimination of workers through Death by Motor Vehicle.

In both cases, the conclusions lack common sense. I hope that we can agree upon that.

In other words, this kind of analysis could potentially require that we decide whether we are willing to fork over money to protect people from Death by Motor Vehicle. It forces us to choose between saving a life or saving costs. When that life is one of your loved ones, what would you choose?

In contrast, a cost-effectiveness approach may be a better solution because it compares the relative costs and outcomes (effects) of two or more courses of action. “Cost-effectiveness analysis is distinct from cost-benefit analysis, which assigns a monetary value to the measure of effect.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost-effectiveness_analysis In this situation, the desired outcome of both courses of action would be an underride guard which did not fail upon collision with a vehicle. The two solutions could be compared based upon cost, but a performance standard of a successful crash test would guarantee that lives would be saved.

Cost.Benefit Analysis

Underride Roundtable Phase 2: Crafting Recommendations to Present to NHTSA For Final Rule

Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, ,

Excerpt from a previous post: Avoid an impasse: Follow-up Underride Roundtable with Negotiated Rulemaking Meeting

It is my hope that we can pursue a recommendation, made by a participant of the Underride Roundtable during the afternoon panel discussion, and organize a group of affected individuals and organizations/companies to meet together and develop a proposal to take to NHTSA in order to bring about a comprehensive negotiated rulemaking.

Yesterday, I sent out an email to participants of the Underride Roundtable–asking them to attend Phase 2 of the Underride Roundtable. I am getting some positive response and also some request for clarification of my goal for this meeting. So, the remainder of this post will serve to clarify what I am proposing.

Basically, the point is that NHTSA–now that the formal Public Comment period has ended for the Rear Underride NPRM–is in the process of reviewing those comments and crafting a final underride rule. Once that “final” rule is published, we will need to determine if it would be an adequate rule.

My thought is that now is the time to be hammering out an agreement–amongst ourselves (trucking industry, manufacturers, consumers, safety advocates, engineers, underride victims)–about what is an acceptable underride rule rather than wait until after NHTSA has already prepared a final rule. This agreement would include all aspects of underride protection.

We want to see it taken care of now and not wait for years to get any additional significant improvement/saved lives. Then, too, from the trucking industry perspective, such a strategy could avoid a situation of continuous changes down the road when solutions are known to be possible now.

Actually, this is what I had hoped would come out of the original Roundtable–a specific recommendation to NHTSA. Since that did not occur, my suggestion is that we go ahead now and hold a second meeting which would allow us to prepare a proposal to present to NHTSA as a petition for a new, comprehensive underride rule.

I am prepared to work to get this organized and underway as soon as possible. I have already had quite a few people get back to me to let me know that they would like to participate in this meeting, which would not strictly speaking be Negotiated Rulemaking but a Facilitated Crafting of Best Practice Recommendations for Underride Protection.

I’m sure that some will react with skepticism that this could ever work. But I am willing to put the effort into pursuing an impossible dream with hopes of realizing an actually-attainable outcome–making underride crashes be a thing of the past.

And if you wonder what makes me think that I (our family) has the authority to bring this about. . . the other day, I was reviewing the OMB Circular A-4. a document from the White House Office of Management & Budget to the heads of Executive Agencies with guidelines for the analysis of proposed regulatory actions.

Basically, a federal regulation should be issued when there has been a failure of the private market to protect the public (decades of underride fatalities and serious injuries). There should be an assessment of the significance of the problem (hundreds of deaths/year–decade after decade), and it should be shown that a government intervention is likely to do more good than harm (industry has complied with previous rules & research has shown that stronger underride protection/rules is/are possible to save more lives ):

Before recommending Federal regulatory action, an agency must demonstrate that the proposed action is necessary. . . Executive Order 12866 states that “Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling need, such as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well being of the American people. . .”

Executive Order 12866 also states that “Each agency shall identify the problem that it intends to address (including, where applicable, the failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new agency action) as well as assess the significance of that problem.”. . . If the regulation is designed to correct a significant market failure, you should describe the failure both qualitatively and (where feasible) quantitatively. You should show that a government intervention is likely to do more good than harm. For other interventions, you should also provide a demonstration of compelling social purpose and the likelihood of effective action. OMB Circular a-4.pdf

Well, then, because the private market has failed to protect us from deadly underride and, furthermore, the government has failed to adequately regulate this safety defect, then it behooves me, as a citizen of this country, to initiate action to rectify this tragic oversight.

Note: If anyone would like to host this meeting at their facility, please let me know as soon as possible so we can get this underway.

Notes on the Rulemaking Process:

  1.  Links on The Rulemaking Process:  https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf, excerpts below. . .
  2. How do public comments affect the final rule? 
  3. What is the role of the President in developing a final rule?

Negotiated Rulemaking

Ralph Nader’s Breaking Through Power civic mobilization conference LIVESTREAMING now.

Safety Advocacy,

You can view Ralph Nader’s historic civic mobilization this week — Breaking Through Power — livestreaming at:

Real News Network.

If you can’t join us at Constitution Hall in Washington DC this week, you can watch at Real News Network.

Spread the word.

 

 

Serenity

Why won’t we adopt a National Vision Zero Goal? Over 20,000 people have asked for it.

AnnaLeah and Mary, Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, ,
Lou Lombardo, Care for Crash Victims, sent out an email today with a recent article from

Automotive News, Can traffic deaths be eliminated? NHTSA’s Rosekind: ‘We’re right on the technological cusp’

“Toyota’s James Kuffner is among a global band of safety experts proposing a radical goal for the auto industry: zero traffic deaths.

 The target may be unattainable, safety advocates concede. But they say it is possible to virtually eliminate the 30,000-plus annual highway fatalities in the U.S.

Kuffner, chief technology officer at the Toyota Research Institute in Palo Alto, Calif., says that if the industry moves decisively, within a decade “the probability of being killed in a traffic accident would be smaller than being killed by lightning.”

But automakers must speed the usual decades long pace of adoption of new technology, safety experts say, and get advanced data-crunching, crash-avoidance and communications capability into vehicles as quickly as possible.

“The longer it isn’t deployed,” Kuffner says, “the more people die.” . . .

Since 2000, automakers have introduced an array of safety technology: forward-collision warning, rear cameras, lane-departure warning, traffic-jam assist, adaptive cruise control and the like. 

Put it all together, says Mark Rosekind, administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and “We’re right on the technological cusp. We have this totally new, really exciting chance to make a difference.”

Well, I am indeed happy to see that attitude. But I wonder why that has not translated into a push for a National Vision Zero Goal. How much more might we accomplish with a shared VISION in place to guide us forward more quickly and effectively as a country in this direction?

NHTSA’s Mark Rosekind was also quoted in this recent article: It’s No Accident: Advocates Want to Speak of Car ‘Crashes’ Instead

“When you use the word ‘accident,’ it’s like, ‘God made it happen,’ ” Mark Rosekind, the head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, said at a driver safety conference this month at the Harvard School of Public Health.

“In our society,” he added, “language can be everything.”

Dr. Rosekind has added his voice to a growing chorus of advocates who say that the persistence of crashes — driving is the most dangerous activity for most people — can be explained in part by widespread apathy toward the issue.

Over 20,000 people signed their name to our Vision Zero Petition. Is anybody listening?

Vision Zero GoalPetitionHeader_option2

Somebody, please get me an audience with President Obama to respond to my Vision Zero Petition!

Avoid an impasse: Follow-up Underride Roundtable with Negotiated Rulemaking Meeting

AnnaLeah and Mary, Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, , , ,

It is my hope that we can pursue a recommendation, made by a participant of the Underride Roundtable during the afternoon panel discussion, and organize a group of affected individuals and organizations/companies to meet together and develop a proposal to take to NHTSA in order to bring about a comprehensive negotiated rulemaking.

I am willing to do the organizing necessary to bring this meeting about. First of all, we need a location for the meeting and therefore I am asking if anyone would like to step forward and host this Negotiated Rulemaking Underride Roundtable. Once that is arranged, then we can proceed with selecting a date, developing an agenda, and sending out the notice.

After our family was instrumental in getting underride rulemaking initiated in July 2014, I realized that, though we had made it over one hurdle, in reality  the battle had only begun. I became concerned that the cost/benefit analysis, which had so often compromised past underride rulemaking, was still a very real threat.

Earlier this week, I wrote a post explaining why I think that a negotiated rulemaking process could be important in overcoming compromise and a possible stalemate (“a situation in which further action or progress by opposing or competing parties seems impossible.”): Is Cost/Benefit Analysis Appropriate for Life & Death Matters? Were their lives worth saving?

The participants, of the May 5, 2016, Underride Roundtable at IIHS, would be qualified to help meet the mandate given to NHTSA to prepare a thorough Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) of the underride issue: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recently issued Circular A-4 guidance on regulatory analyses, requiring federal agencies to “prepare a CEA for all major rulemakings for which the primary benefits are improved public health and safety to the extent that a valid effectiveness measure can be developed to represent expected health and safety outcomes.”  Appendix G–Health Based Cost Effectiveness Analysis.pdf

A Negotiated Rulemaking Underride Roundtable could provide a format for development of a more effective and comprehensive underride rule, which would cover all the bases with existing and proposed technology to save as many lives as is humanly possible. It would also get the manufacturing companies out of limbo so that they can make long-term plans and move forward with designing and producing safer products. Win/Win. N’est-ce pas?

Now that the formal comment period is over for the NPRM on Rear Underride on Trailers, the next step is for NHTSA to review the comments and develop a final rule. Let’s strike while the iron is hot and present them with a unified recommendation to enhance their efforts. Before it’s too late.

Let’s send the message to NHTSA that we are all willing to do the work to bring about an acceptable, all-inclusive underride rule.

VA Tech guard installed
Virginia Tech underride guard installed by Senior Design Team, April 2016

See other posts related to the Underride Roundtable here: Tag Archives: Underride Roundtable

AnnaLeah & Mary for Truck Safety is ready to roll. How about you?

8 Picture 657LOGO AnnaLeah & Mary for Truck Safety

Other Research Which Should Not Be Ignored in Current Underride Rulemaking

Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, , , ,

NHTSA, in the Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation of the NPRM issued in December 2015 for Rear Underride on Trailers, requested information about underride guard crash tests at higher speeds (than the 35 mph currently being proposed). This is what they said,

We recognize, however, that benefits may accrue from underride crashes at speeds higher than 56 km/h (35 mph), if, e.g., a vehicle’s guard exceeded the minimum performance requirements of the FMVSS. NHTSA requests information that would assist the agency in quantifying the possible benefits of CMVSS No. 223 rear impact guards in crashes with speeds higher than 56 km/h (35 mph) . See: NPRM Rear Impact Guards, Rear Impact Protection December 2015 document; A Summary of Some of the Highlights

Here are some additional links to underride research around the world which should be taken into consideration when developing improved underride designs and standards.

  1. Evaluation of Energy Absorbing Pliers Underride Guards for Rear and Sides of Large Trucks
  2. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW UNDERRIDE GUARDS FOR ENHANCEMENT OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN TRUCKS AND CARS
  3. NHTSA NCAP #00248 Truck Underride Guard (Quinton Hazell Guard)

These links supplement the more lengthy list of underride research, which I posted previously here: Underride Roundtable To Consider Underride Research From Around the Globe.

I propose a Tired Trucker Roundtable to more comprehensively address driver fatigue crashes.

AnnaLeah and Mary, Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, , , , , , ,

After the truck crash which killed AnnaLeah and Mary, we never saw the truck driver’s paper log books and he was not able to tell us why he hit us. We suspect that drowsy driving may well have played a part. But it is a very difficult thing to prove.

I can’t go back and re-do that day and make sure that truck driver is fully alert throughout his entire work day on the road–especially that stretch of I-20 in Georgia near Exit 130. But I can advocate for the widespread public health problem of driver fatigue to be recognized and tackled.

Tired Trucker Roundtable

I am soooo tired of the political tug-of-war over truck driver hours of service. It isn’t solving the basic problem, folks. And the problem isn’t going to go away if there is no change in how it is addressed.

Just like with the deadly underride issue, we need to gather together people and organizations from all over the board, including truckers, truck companies, sleep doctors, regulatory officials from DOT and the Department of Labor and CDC’s Department of Injury Prevention, sleep researchers, safety advocates, and victims of tired trucker crashes.

At this life-changing event, let’s communicate about every possible factor which can contribute to drowsy driving–including, but most certainly not limited to, the truckers’ hours of service on the job and research on driver fatigue. And then, let’s brainstorm together about how this Goliath can be conquered through collaborative strategies and solutions.

A Tired Trucker Roundtable. Now that would be worthy of shouting, “Awesome!” Eh, Mary?!

0 260 29gertie 2886gertie 2890

Vision Zero collaborative creativity can achieve amazzzzing results!

 

Should Congress be deciding trucker hours? Maybe they should set a National Vision Zero Goal instead.

Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, ,
Perhaps, instead of deciding what trucker hours of service should look like, Congress or the President of this fine country of ours should establish a White House Vision Zero Task Force and authorize Vision Zero Rulemaking to save lives. Just sayin’ . . .
Dear Care for Crash Victims Community Members:

What should Hours of Service Rules be for safety on the roads?

I have often thought that if anyone in a position of responsibility for governing this question were required to spend one week riding with a truck driver before voting or acting on it in the Executive or Judicial branches, the rule would be closer to:

*   40 hour week

*  5 day week maximum

*  8 hour day with 1/2 hour for lunch and two 15 minute breaks in each 4 hour stretch.

Do you think any longer hours will result in preventable deaths and serious injuries and be a form of economic slavery?

Lou Lombardo
Driving While Fatigued

Side note to Cost/Benefit Analysis Question: The fallacy behind the Australian fed. gov’t’s CBA.

Safety Advocacy, Truck Safety, , ,

Here’s a little side note on the cost/benefit analysis (CBA) debate from around the globe in Australia:

The fallacy behind the Australian Federal Government’s CBA is that the cost to the tax payer is minimal to introduce a new mandatory standard requiring crashworthy underrun barriers.

The cost is in effect born by the truck manufacturers which the industry accepts.

That’s the irony of the situation.

At most it might add a fraction of a cent to the cost of your Corn Flakes which I am sure if presented to consumers, they would gladly pay if it saved lives.

The disgusting truth to the Australian Federal Regulator’s CBA is that a ‘virtual’ cost has been added by them, i.e. cost to the industry.

That is being touted by the Federal Government as being more important than the well-being or life of a human being.

Raphael Grzebieta, Professor, Road Safety

Underride Roundtable May 5, 2016 169