Mary Barra: “If it’s a safety issue, there should not be a business case calculated.” What about underride?

I have been wrestling with the question: Does NHTSA do a cost/benefit analysis before issuing a recall on an auto safety defect which has been shown to cause deaths? And if not, then why do they do a cost/benefit analysis to determine whether or not to require underride protection be put on trucks to prevent deadly underride?

And, in general, is the cost/benefit analysis which they have done on underride been flawed? Cost Benefit Public Comments on Underride Rulemaking

 

The Price Of Human Life, According To GM

Cost benefit analysis of safety recalls cspan video footage of GM Ignition Recall Senate Hearing, Mary Barra, CEO at GM

Mary Barra at 0:25: “If there is a safety defect, there is not a calculation done on business case or cost. It’s how quickly we can get the repair. . .whatever needs to be done to make sure the vehicles are safe that our customers are driving.”

Mary Barra at 3:21: “Again, if it’s a safety issue, there should not be a business case calculated.”

The difference is that underride is not about an auto safety defect. It is not about occupant protection on a car, and it is not about occupant protection on a truck. It is about equipment on a truck to protect those who might collide with it. No man’s land in terms of perceived responsibility.

See this description of that dilemma from a Transportation Research Board report titled, The Domain of Truck and Bus Safety Research, May 2017, p. 135:

An added complication for safety technologies is that the beneficiaries of heavy-truck safety are primarily other drivers, not the owners or drivers of the trucks. In a highly competitive business atmosphere, truck buyers are not easily motivated to purchase new technologies solely for the public good. Added equipment must also contribute to their company’s profitability in some way and thereby enable them to compete with other companies that have not purchased the same technologies. For this reason, many new safety technologies that are developed and demonstrated are very slow to be deployed. Those safety devices that do gain widespread acceptance generally have secondary-ancillary functions or capabilities that offer a short-term payback to the buyer.

Given these realities, the federal government plays an important role in the process of introducing new safety technologies into the commercial market. Large demonstration programs, involving broad involvement of all the suppliers of a given technology and all the medium-to heavy-truck manufacturers are essential to creating both a sufficient body of data and evidence that a product or technology performs well, in addition to a sense within the industry that the product will be cost-effective and, therefore, worth buying. It is a difficult task to create this critical mass and one that often only the government can accomplish.

In some cases, regulation may be the only way to achieve significant deployment. Even when there is a general consensus that the total benefits of introduction of a new safety technology would outweigh the total costs, there is still the problem of convincing individual vehicle buyers to pay for societal benefits. A regulatory requirement would level the playing field by requiring all companies to buy the equipment and thus eliminate the competitive financial disparity. Regulations are always controversial. It is extremely difficult to quantify the benefits of a technology before the fact. The Domain of Truck and Bus Safety Research

Another interesting read: The Hidden Benefits of Regulation: Disclosing the Auto Safety Payoff, 1985, Joan Claybrook and David Bollier

What do you think?

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